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Abstract
This paper investigates rationalizable implementation of social choice
sets (SCSs) in incomplete information environments. We identify rational-
izable incentive compatibility (RIC) as its key condition, argue by means
of example that RIC is strictly weaker than the standard Bayesian incen-
tive compatibility (BIC), and show that RIC reduces to BIC when we only
consider single-valued SCSs (i.e., social choice functions or SCFs). We next
identify additional necessary conditions and, essentially closing the gap be-
tween necessity and sufficiency, obtain a sufficiency result for rationalizable
implementation in general environments. We also characterize a well-studied
class of economic environments in which RIC is essentially the only condition
needed for rationalizable implementation. Considering SCFs, we show that
interim rationalizable monotonicity, found in the literature, is not necessary
for rationalizable implementation, as had been previously claimed.
JEL Classification: C72, D78, D82.
Keywords: rationalizable incentive compatibility, Bayesian incentive com-
patibility, uniform Bayesian monotonicity, interim rationalizable monotonic-
ity, implementation, rationalizability.
1 Introduction
The theory of incentives is one of the cornerstones of modern economic theory.
In it, a central condition is Bayesian incentive compatibility (BIC), viewed as a
∗We owe special thanks to Rene Saran for useful comments and corrections. All remaining
errors are our own.
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minimal condition necessary for the implementation of any set of rules or contracts
under incomplete information.1 BIC stipulates that, in the direct mechanism based
on a given rule, truth-telling be a best response for every type to the belief that the
others are also telling the truth. Indeed, in trying to elicit the private information
held by a group of agents, the mechanism designer should at least hope that,
under common knowledge of rationality, if all but one of the agents are going to be
truthful, so will be the remaining agent; this is the rationale for BIC as a minimal
desideratum. As such, BIC is an equilibrium condition, based on the rational-
expectations assumption, by which all agents share exactly the same belief about
how the others will play, i.e., the truthful equilibrium belief. It turns out that the
restriction imposed by BIC can sometimes be quite severe, being responsible for
impossibility results in some settings.
Suppose instead that, although the mechanism designer continues to assume
that rationality is commonly known by the agents, she does not insist on the
rational-expectations assumption. Under incomplete information, this means that
she expects the agents to use (interim) rationalizable strategies.2 In general, if the
designer’s goals are summarized by a social choice set (SCS), she would seek to
design a mechanism whose set of outcomes resulting from agents choosing ratio-
nalizable messages, will coincide (or at least be a subset of) the SCS of interest.3
These would correspond, respectively, to the notions of full (weak) implementation
in rationalizable strategies.
The first main result of this paper is the identification of a weakening of BIC,
which we term rationalizable incentive compatibility (RIC), that is necessary for
full or weak implementation of SCSs in interim rationalizable strategies (Theo-
rem 1). The definition of RIC may seem complicated at first blush, but it is very
simple conceptually. It requires that truth-telling, rather than being a Bayesian
equilibrium, be a rationalizable profile in the direct mechanism associated with an
extended SCF whose domain is a suitably defined expanded type space (the out-
comes assigned by the extended SCF over the expanded type space, when mapped
back to the original type space, coincide with the outcomes prescribed by the orig-
inal SCS). The proof of Theorem 1 expresses a new kind of “revelation principle”
once we work with the expanded type space, a principle that is consistent with the
logic of rationalizability. Namely, each expanded type consists of a type in the orig-
1See, e.g., Dasgupta, Hammond, and Maskin (1979), Myerson (1979, 1981), d’Aspremont and
Gerard-Varet (1979), Green and Laffont (1979), and Harris and Townsend (1981) for original
contributions to this fundamental idea.
2See Bernheim (1984), Pearce (1984), Brandenburger and Dekel (1987), and Lipman (1994)
for the formalization of the idea of rationalizability; in this paper, we use the interim extension
to games with incomplete information of Dekel, Fudenberg, and Morris (2007).
3If her goal is a unique outcome in each state, this is described by a social choice function
(SCF).
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inal type space and a rationalizable action in the implementing mechanism. Then,
the “rationalizable mediator” recommends to each expanded type that it behave
as its true original type and choose one of its rationalizable actions, and each
expanded type obeys the recommendation. Notice how following the recommen-
dation is a best response for each expanded type, given the beliefs that supported
the recommended action as rationalizable in the implementing mechanism in the
first place.
It is easy to see that RIC is weaker than BIC in general for SCSs, and we show
by example that it is strictly weaker. On the other hand, RIC reduces to BIC for
SCFs, because the beliefs to which agents best-respond can be collapsed to a sin-
gleton, given the unique outcome prescribed by the SCF. Thus, to appreciate the
full power of RIC, the set-valuedness of the solution is underscored: the mechanism
designer and the agents realize that, instead of making pointwise predictions – as
one would do under an equilibrium logic –, they are forced to be more flexible and
accept a set of outcomes that may happen, supported by rationalizable messages.
Given that the rational-expectations assumption is not invoked, the designer and
the agents alike are bound to be “wrong” about the actual implementation of a
specific outcome, but they still accept the fact that agents choose whatever message
they are choosing, as it is a best response to other agents’ rationalizable messages.
Notice how this is very different from the implementation of an SCS in Bayesian
equilibrium, for which each SCF in the SCS can be implemented with complete
independence of the rest of the set. With rationalizability and set-valuedness, im-
plementation theory should identify the set of things that might happen, as opposed
to the set of things that will happen, the latter being the view held when one as-
sumes equilibrium theories. This subtle conceptual distinction becomes blurred if
one insists on SCFs. Therefore, the weakening of the incentive constraints that
entails the switch from BIC to RIC may allow for more permissive results, but
they will have to be understood following this slightly different interpretation.
Our next result (Theorem 2) is not different from the analogous result for
Bayesian equilibrium. It shows that if an SCS is weakly or fully implementable
in rationalizable strategies, it must satisfy closure with respect to the concatena-
tion of common-knowledge events. No new outcomes should be added because of
any extra correlation between two such events. As in Bayesian implementation,
this also applies to rationalizable strategies, which should not depend upon such
correlations.
Next, the paper turns to full implementation, and identifies an additional nec-
essary condition. We identify a new condition, uniform Bayesian monotonicity
(UBM), which is an extension of the uniform monotonicity of Kunimoto and
Serrano (2019) to incomplete-information environments. Compared to Bayesian
monotonicity – BM – (Postlewaite and Schmeidler (1986), Palfrey and Srivas-
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tava (1989), Jackson (1991)), UBM just changes the order of a key quantifier in
the preference nestedness requirement. That is, UBM is to BM just like uniform
monotonicity is to Maskin monotonicity (Maskin (1999)) in settings with com-
plete information; importantly, UBM is weaker than BM and reduces to it for
SCFs. Theorem 3 shows UBM to be necessary for full interim implementation in
rationalizable strategies.
In Theorem 4, we show that the three necessary conditions (RIC, UBM, and
closure), along with three additional regularity conditions often satisfied in many
environments, are also sufficient for full interim rationalizable implementation. As
in Kunimoto and Serrano (2019), the method of proof is a mechanism where a
modulo game is centrally featured. Among the things agents should announce in
the mechanism, one item is a vote for a king to be elected. The modulo game
counts these votes and elects the king, and the implemented outcome is the one
chosen by the king. This construction allows for the entire SCS to happen under
rationalizable play, as each agent holds optimistic beliefs thinking that the king
will announce the outcome that is top-ranked by the agent in the SCS.
Our general sufficiency theorem just described essentially closes the gap between
necessity and sufficiency, but in doing so, it relies on an abstract mechanism that
some may view as unnatural. In response, we study a wide class of economic
environments, where less abstract mechanisms can be used. In particular, we
show in Theorem 5 how in certain economic environments, such as an independent
private-values auction, the only condition that characterizes implementation in
rationalizable strategies is RIC. We illustrate our approach with the analysis of
such settings in Battigalli and Siniscalchi (2003). The result can be extended to
some settings with multidimensional signals, and in this context, we also discuss a
general impossibility result of Jehiel and Moldovanu (2001).
Our last section is devoted to SCFs, which is the object that has been studied
by previous papers dealing with iteratively undominated strategies (Abreu and
Matsushima (1992)) or rationalizability (Bergemann and Morris (2008), Oury and
Tercieux (2012)).4 In particular, we discuss the connections between our conditions
and interim rationalizable monotonicity (IRM), which appears in those works. In
particular, we show that IRM is not necessary for rationalizable implementation.
In the process, we also discuss the role of finite mechanisms, in order to understand
the scope of improvement for sufficiency results.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we introduce the
general notation needed for the paper. In Section 3, we propose the concept of
interim implementation in rationalizable strategies. In Section 4, we illustrate the
implications of rationalizable implementation via an example, which we keep revis-
4The Abrue-Matsushima paper uses virtual implementation, which has led to the development
of an interesting literature. Here, we concentrate on exact implementation.
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iting later to illustrate our concepts. In Section 5, we identify necessary conditions
for implementation in rationalizable strategies. Section 6 provides the sufficiency
result for rationalizable implementation in general environments. In Section 7,
we study economic environments. Section 8 focuses on SCFs, and Section 9 con-
cludes. In the appendix, we provide all the omitted proofs of results in the paper
and extend our sufficiency result to environments with even weaker assumptions.
2 Preliminaries
Let N = {1, . . . , n} denote the finite set of agents and Ti be a finite set of types
of agent i.5 Let T ≡ T1 × · · · × Tn, and T−i ≡ T1 × · · · × Ti−1 × Ti+1 × · · · × Tn.6
Let ∆(T−i) denote the set of probability distributions over T−i. Each agent i has
a system of “interim” beliefs that is expressed as a function pii : Ti → ∆(T−i).
Then, we call (Ti, pii)i∈N a type space. Let A denote a finite set of pure outcomes,
which are assumed to be independent of the information state. Let ∆(A) be the
set of probability distributions over A. Agent i’s state dependent von Neumann-
Morgenstern utility function is denoted ui : ∆(A)×T → R. We can now define an
environment as E = (A, {ui, Ti, pii}i∈N).
An event E = E1×· · ·×En ⊆ T is said to be belief-closed if, for each i ∈ N and
ti ∈ Ei, we have pii(ti)[E−i] = 1. In words, if an event E is a belief-closed subspace,
it is commonly certain among the agents that E obtains. The environment is
implicitly understood to be belief-closed among the agents. Suppose the planner
(or mechanism designer) cares about the set of type profiles T ∗ ⊆ T . This paper
takes T ∗ as an arbitrary belief-closed subspace of (Ti, pii)i∈N . Let T ∗i ⊆ Ti comprise
the set of types ti such that there exists t−i with (ti, t−i) ∈ T ∗. For example, Jackson
(1991) assumes that all agents have a common support prior over T . Then, T ∗ is
interpreted as the set of profiles of types to which agents assign strictly positive
probability.
A (stochastic) social choice function (SCF) is a single-valued function f : T →
∆(A). Let F = {f | f : T → ∆∗(A)} be the set of SCFs, mapping into ∆∗(A),
defined as a finite subset of ∆(A). The finiteness of F is imposed simply to avoid
measurability issues in the main text.
A social choice set (SCS) F is a nonempty compact subset of F. We say that
two SCSs F and H are equivalent (F ≈ H) if there exists a bijection ξ : F → H
5In the appendix (Section A.3), we discuss the extension to a Polish space Ti associated with
its Borel sigma-algebra Ti. In particular, we can take Ti to be a compact subset of a Euclidean
space. This is especially relevant when we discuss economic environments in Section 7. In the
same section of the appendix, we also extend the analysis to infinite sets of outcomes and of
social choice functions, whose definitions follow shortly.
6Similar notation will be used for products of other sets.
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such that for every f ∈ F and every h ∈ H satisfying h = ξ(f), f(t) = h(t) for all
t ∈ T ∗. This means that the two SCSs “coincide” for every t ∈ T ∗. For an SCF f ,
the interim expected utility of agent i of type ti, who pretends to be of type t
′
i, is
defined as:
Ui(f ; t
′
i|ti) ≡
∑
t−i∈T−i
pii(ti)[t−i]ui(f(t′i, t−i)); (ti, t−i)).
Let Ui(f |ti) = Ui(f ; ti|ti).
A mechanism (or game form) Γ = ((Mi)i∈N , g) describes: (i) a nonempty
countable message space Mi for each agent i, and (ii) an outcome function g :
M → ∆(A), where M = ×i∈NMi.7 Let ΓDR = ((Ti)i∈N , f) denote the direct
revelation mechanism associated with an SCF f , i.e., a mechanism where Mi = Ti
for all i and g = f .
We close the section on preliminaries with the important notion of a deception.
A deception is a collection β = (βi)i∈N , where each βi : Ti → Ti, and there exist
i ∈ N and ti ∈ Ti for whom βi(ti) 6= ti. Write β(t) = (β1(t1), . . . , βn(tn)), and
for an SCF f , write f ◦ β to denote the SCF f garbled by the deception β, i.e.,
f ◦ β(t) = f(β(t)) for all t ∈ T .
3 Implementation in Rationalizable Strategies
We adopt interim correlated rationalizability (Dekel, Fudenberg, and Morris (2007))
as a solution concept and investigate the implications of implementation in interim
correlated “rationalizable” strategies. We fix a mechanism Γ = (M, g) and define a
message correspondence profile S = (S1, . . . , Sn), where each Si : Ti → 2Mi , and we
write S for the collection of message correspondence profiles. The collection S is
a lattice with the natural ordering of set inclusion: S ≤ S ′ if Si(ti) ⊆ S ′i(ti) for all
i ∈ N and ti ∈ Ti. The largest element is S¯ = (S¯1, . . . , S¯n), where S¯i(ti) = Mi for
each i ∈ N and ti ∈ Ti. The smallest element is S = (S1, . . . , Sn), where Si(ti) = ∅
for each i ∈ N and ti ∈ Ti.
We define an operator b to iteratively eliminate never best responses. The
operator b : S → S is thus defined as: for every i ∈ N and ti ∈ Ti,
bi(S)[ti] ≡
mi
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
∃λi ∈ ∆(T−i ×M−i) such that
(1)λi(t−i,m−i) > 0⇒ m−i ∈ S−i(t−i);
(2)
∑
m−i λi(t−i,m−i) = pii(ti)[t−i];
(3)mi ∈ arg maxm′i
∑
t−i,m−i λi(t−i,m−i)ui(g(m
′
i,m−i); ti, t−i)
 .
7In the appendix (Section A.3), we also discuss how the analysis can be extended to a more
general class of mechanisms.
6
Observe that b is increasing by definition: i.e., S ≤ S ′ ⇒ b(S) ≤ b(S ′). By
Tarski’s fixed-point theorem, there is a largest fixed point of b, which we label
SΓ(T ). Thus, (i) b(SΓ(T )) = SΓ(T ) and (ii) b(S) = S ⇒ S ≤ SΓ(T ). We can also
construct the fixed point SΓ(T ) by starting with S¯ – the largest element of the
lattice – and iteratively applying the operator b. If the message sets are finite, we
have
S
Γ(T )
i (ti) ≡
⋂
k≥1
bi
(
bk
(
S¯
))
[ti]
for each i ∈ N and ti ∈ Ti. However, since the mechanism Γ may be infinite,
transfinite induction may be necessary to reach the fixed point. It is useful to
define
S
Γ(T ),k
i (ti) ≡ bi
(
bk−1
(
S¯
))
[ti],
using transfinite induction if necessary. Thus, S
Γ(T )
i (ti) are the sets of messages
surviving (transfinite) iterated deletion of never best responses of type ti of agent
i. We denote by σi a selection from S
Γ(T )
i and call it a rationalizable strategy of
agent i. We recall the following structure of SΓ(T ):
SΓ(T ) =
∏
i∈N
S
Γ(T )
i .
Next, we provide the definitions of rationalizable implementation that we use
in the paper.
Definition 1 (Full Implementation in Rationalizable Strategies) An SCS
F is fully implementable in rationalizable strategies if there exists a mech-
anism Γ = (M, g) with the following three properties: (i) for each t ∈ T ∗,⋃
m∈SΓ(T )(t)
{g(m)} = F (t),
(ii) for any i ∈ N, ti ∈ Ti, and σi ∈ SΓ(T )i , there exist a belief λσi(ti)i ∈ ∆(T−i×M−i)
and profile of pure strategies σ−i ∈ SΓ(T )−i , such that λσi(ti)i (t−i, σ−i(t−i)) = 1 for each
t−i ∈ T−i, and σi(ti) is a best response against λσi(ti)i , and (iii) for any σ′ , σ′′ ∈ SΓ(T )
and T
′
, T
′′ ⊆ T for which T ′ ∪ T ′′ = T and T ′ ∩ T ′′ = ∅, there exists f ∈ F such
that for any t ∈ T ∗,
f(t) =
{
g(σ
′
(t)) if t ∈ T ′
g(σ
′′
(t)) if t ∈ T ′′
Condition (i) is the usual requirement for full implementation. That is, over the
states the designer cares about, each outcome that corresponds to rationalizable
message profiles must be in the SCS of interest, and vice versa, for each SCF in the
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SCS of interest, there exist rationalizable messages that yield it as their outcome.
Condition (ii) is a slight strengthening, and it requires that every rationalizable
strategy can be made a best response to some “degenerate” belief regarding other
players’ strategies. We note that this second requirement is inconsequential when
we only consider SCFs. Condition (iii) is a weak regularity requirement, which
imposes no restriction on rationalizably implementable SCSs as long as we care
about equivalent SCSs.
A definition that is weaker than full implementation relaxes Condition (i) to
require only its former part:
Definition 2 (Weak Implementation in Rationalizable Strategies) An SCS
F is weakly implementable in rationalizable strategies if there exists a
mechanism Γ = (M, g) with the following three properties: (i) for each t ∈ T ∗,
∅ 6=
⋃
m∈SΓ(T )(t)
{g(m)} ⊆ F (t),
and conditions (ii) and (iii) as above.
It is clear that, if one is interested in implementing an SCF, both notions of
implementation just presented coincide.
4 An Example
In order to begin illustrating the different concepts in the paper, we consider the
following example, an incomplete-information variant of the main example in Ku-
nimoto and Serrano (2019). There are two agents N = {1, 2}; two states {α, β}
and a finite number of pure outcomes A = {a1, a2, . . . , aK} where K ≥ 4. For
simplicity, we assume that the set of lotteries over A includes each pure outcome
as a degenerate lottery and it is a finite set. We denote by ∆F (A) such a set of
lotteries over A. Assume that agent 1 is uninformed of the state and agent 2 is
informed of the state. Accordingly, we define T2 = {tα, tβ} as the set of types for
agent 2 such that agent 2 of type tα knows that the state is α and type tβ knows
that the state is β. Assume also that agent 1 believes with probability qα that the
state is α and with probability (1− qα) that it is β where qα ∈ (0, 1).
Agent 1’s utility function has the following features: (1) u1(ak) = u1(ak;α) =
u1(ak; β) for each ak ∈ A (state-independence) and (2)
u1(aK) > u1(a1) > u1(a2) > · · · > u1(aK−1).
Agent 2’s utility function in state α has the following features:
u2(aK ;α) > u2(a2;α) > u2(aK−1;α) > · · · > u2(a1;α).
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Agent 2’s utility function in state β has the following features:
u2(aK ; β) > u2(aK−1; β) > · · · > u2(a1; β) > u2(a2; β).
We further assume that u2(ak) = u2(ak, α) = u2(ak; β) for any ak ∈ A\{a2} (state-
independence, except for a2).
We next discuss the value of qα needed for the argument that follows. Define
ε = min
k 6=K
min
φ∈∆F (A):u1(φ)−u1(ak)>0
u1(φ)− u1(ak).
We choose qα large enough so that qα > 1/(1 + ε).
We consider the following SCS F = {fK−1,K , fK,K} ∪ {fk,K−1}K−1k=1 , where fi,j
denotes the SCF that assigns alternative ai in state α and aj in state β.
We now show that the SCS F is implementable in rationalizable strategies
using a finite mechanism. Consider the following mechanism Γ = (M, g) where
Mi = {m1i ,m2i , . . . ,mKi } for each i = 1, 2 and the deterministic outcome function
g(·) is given in the table below:
g(m) Agent 2
m12 m
2
2 m
3
2 m
4
2 · · · mK−12 mK2
m11 a1 a1 aK−2 aK−3 · · · a2 aK−1
m21 a2 a1 a1 aK−2 · · · a3 aK−1
m31 a3 a2 a1 a1 · · · a4 aK−1
Agent 1 m41 a4 a3 a2 a1 · · · a5 aK−1
...
...
...
...
...
. . .
...
...
mK−11 a1 aK−2 aK−3 aK−4 · · · a1 aK−1
mK1 aK−1 aK−1 aK−1 aK−1 · · · aK−1 aK
Fact 1 The SCS F is fully implementable in rationalizable strategies by the finite
mechanism Γ.
Proof : Recall that we choose qα sufficiently close to one. This means that agent
1 believes with sufficiently high probability that the state is α. Then, no message of
agent 1 in the mechanism Γ is eliminated. We elaborate on this argument further:
for each k ∈ {1, . . . , K−1}, mk1 is a best response to the belief that agent 2 chooses
mk2 for sure. In addition, m
K
1 is a best response to the belief that agent 2 chooses
mK2 for sure.
Recall that agent 2 is informed of the state. In state α, no message of agent
2 in the mechanism Γ = (M, g) is eliminated. Specifically, we argue as follows:
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for each k ∈ {1, . . . , K − 2}, mk2 can be a best response to the belief that agent 1
chooses mk+11 for sure. In addition, m
K−1
2 can be a best response to the belief that
agent 1 chooses m11 for sure; and m
K
2 is a best response to the belief that agent 1
chooses mK1 for sure.
Consider now state β. In that state, message mK2 strictly dominates all other
messages, m12, . . . ,m
K−1
2 .
Furthermore, since qα is high enough, agent 1 is still unable to eliminate any
message, even after agent 2’s first round of elimination (all messages but one in
state β). It follows that no further eliminations can occur.
The preceding arguments show that S
Γ(T )
1 = M1, S
Γ(T )
2,tα = M2, and S
Γ(T )
2,tβ
=
{mK2 }. Therefore, all the SCFs in the SCS proposed are implementable in interim
rationalizable strategies. Specifically, when agent 1 chooses mK1 , both outcomes
aK−1 and aK can occur in state α, but only aK in state β. And when agent 1
chooses any other message, any outcome in {a1, a2, . . . , aK−1} can happen in state
α, but only aK−1 in state β. We also confirm that the second requirement of
implementability is satisfied. This completes the proof. 
This example will become important for many of our conditions, and we shall
revisit it multiple times in due course as a result.
5 Necessary Conditions for SCSs
5.1 Necessary Conditions for Weak or Full Implementation
To begin with, consider the traditional incentive compatibility condition:
Definition 3 An SCS F satisfies Bayesian incentive compatibility (BIC)
if, for each f ∈ F , i ∈ N , and ti, t′i ∈ T ∗i ,
Ui(f |ti) ≥ Ui(f ; t′i|ti).
In addition, F satisfies strict-if-responsive Bayesian incentive compatibil-
ity (SIRBIC) if, for every f ∈ F , the above inequality holds as a strict inequality
whenever there exists tˆ−i ∈ T−i such that f(ti, tˆ−i) 6= f(t′i, tˆ−i); and F satisfies
strict Bayesian incentive compatibility if, for every f ∈ F , the above inequality
holds as a strict inequality whenever ti 6= t′i.
Bayesian incentive compatibility is known to be a necessary condition for the
(weak or full) implementation in Bayesian equilibrium of SCSs. The reader is
referred to Jackson (1991) for this, for example. Considering again the example in
Section 4, BIC is not necessary for (weak or full) implementation in rationalizable
strategies:
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Fact 2 The SCS F in the example of section 4 violates Bayesian incentive com-
patibility.
Proof : This is easy to see. The direct mechanism associated with any SCF is a
one-agent game form; given the preferences of the informed agent, any nonconstant
SCF in the SCS F violates Bayesian incentive compatibility. 
Instead, a new condition that describes “rationalizable incentives” is called for,
and that condition will become central in our paper. Indeed, we propose a weaker
condition, and preparing for it, we provide the next definitions.
The tuple T = (Ti, Ti, tˆi, pˆii)i∈N is said to be an expanded type space on (Ti, pii)i∈N
if, for each i ∈ N , tˆi : Ti → Ti is an onto mapping and for each τi ∈ Ti and t−i ∈ T−i,
pˆii : Ti → ∆(T−i) satisfies that∑
τ−i:tˆ−i(τ−i)=t−i
pˆii(tˆi(τi))[τ−i] = pii(tˆi(τi))[t−i].
Definition 4 An SCS F satisfies rationalizable incentive compatibility (RIC)
if there exist an expanded type space T = (Ti, Ti, tˆi, pˆii)i∈N on (Ti, pii)i∈N and an ex-
tended SCF f˜ : T → ∆(A) such that the identity mapping I : T → T constitutes
a rationalizable message profile in the associated direct mechanism ΓDR(T , f˜) and
f˜ ◦ tˆ−1 ≈ F ′ ⊆ F , where f˜ ◦ tˆ−1 denotes the set of SCFs such that ⋃τ :tˆ(τ)=t{f˜(τ)}
for each occurrence of t.
An SCS F satisfies fully rationalizable incentive compatibility if it sat-
isfies RIC and F
′
= F .
For SCFs, the RIC condition can be written as follows:
Definition 5 An SCF f satisfies rationalizable incentive compatibility (RIC)
if there exist an expanded type space T = (Ti, Ti, tˆi, pˆii)i∈N on (Ti, pii)i∈N and an ex-
tended SCF f˜ : T → ∆(A) such that the identity mapping I : T → T constitutes
a rationalizable message profile in the associated direct mechanism ΓDR(T , f˜) and
f˜ ◦ tˆ−1 ≈ f , where f˜ ◦ tˆ−1 denotes the set of SCFs such that ⋃τ :tˆ(τ)=t{f˜(τ)} for
each occurrence of t.
We establish the following observation:
Proposition 1 An SCF f satisfies rationalizable incentive compatibility if and
only if it satisfies Bayesian incentive compatibility.
Proof : The “if” part is straightforward to show. So, we only focus on the “only
if” part. To show this, suppose that the SCF f satisfies RIC, which guarantees
the existence of the expanded type space T = (Ti, Ti, tˆi, pˆii)i∈N on (Ti, pii)i∈N , the
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extended SCF f˜ : T → ∆(A) such that f˜ ◦ tˆ−1 ≈ f , and the fact that truth-
telling is rationalizable in the associated direct mechanism ΓDR(T , f˜). We set
Ti = Ti × Mi such that Mi is an arbitrary countable set and tˆi(ti,mi) = ti for
each (ti,mi) ∈ Ti ×Mi. Thus, we get that, for every agent i ∈ N , extended type
τi = (ti,mi) is best-responding by telling the truth to her belief λi with support
of the following kind: λi(t−i,m−i) > 0 ⇒ for each j 6= i, extended type (tj,mj)
truthfully announces (tj,mj). Taking into account the definition of pˆii(tˆi(τi))[τ−i],
and since the outcome of truth-telling in the direct mechanism ΓDR(T , f˜) is f(t)
for every underlying type profile t, one can take, without loss of generality, a
degenerate belief λi held by type ti in the direct mechanism for f concentrated on
the true type reports (tj)j 6=i, to which truth-telling is a best response. Since agent
i and type ti were chosen arbitrarily, this shows that truth-telling is a Bayesian
(Nash) equilibrium in the direct mechanism for f , and hence, f satisfies BIC. 
We next present our first main result:
Theorem 1 If an SCS F is (weakly or fully) implementable in rationalizable
strategies, there exists an equivalent SCS Fˆ ≈ F such that the SCS Fˆ satisfies
rationalizable incentive compatibility.
Proof : Suppose that the SCS F is (weakly or fully) implementable in ratio-
nalizable strategies by the mechanism Γ = (M, g). Then, for any t ∈ T ∗,⋃
m∈SΓ(T )(t)
{g(m)} = F ′(t) ⊆ F (t).
When we require full (rather than weak) implementation, we have F
′
(t) = F (t).
For each i ∈ N , we define
Ti =
⋃
ti∈Ti
⋃
mi∈SΓ(T )i (ti)
{(ti,mi)}
and for each τi ∈ Ti, there exists ti ∈ Ti such that mi ∈ SΓ(T )i (ti), where τi =
(ti,mi). Then, we define tˆi(τi) = ti accordingly. Here tˆi maps for each new aug-
mented type the original type behind that message. This is an onto map.
Thus, constructing the beliefs pˆii making use of the beliefs λi(m−i, t−i) held by
ti to which each message mi ∈ SΓ(T )(ti) is a best reply for type ti, and obeying
the obvious adding-up constraints from the pii’s, we have an expanded type space
T = (Ti, Ti, tˆi, pˆii)i∈N .
For each σ ∈ SΓ(T ), by implementability, the outcome function of the mecha-
nism yields an SCF f ∈ F such that f = g ◦ σ. Then, one can define an extended
SCF f˜ : for each τ ∈ T , there exists a message profile m ∈ SΓ(T )(tˆ(τ)) such that
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f˜(τ) = g(m). By construction of the expanded type space T and the extended
SCF f˜ , we can easily see that the identity mapping I : T → T constitutes a
rationalizable strategy profile in the associated direct mechanism ΓDR(T , f˜), i.e.,
I ∈ SΓDR(T ,f˜). Furthermore, defining an SCS Fˆ such that Fˆ (t) = ⋃τ :tˆ(τ)=t{f˜(τ)}
for any t ∈ T , by construction, we have that Fˆ ≈ F ′ ⊆ F . This completes the
proof. 
Remark: Rationalizable incentive compatibility of an SCS F is equivalent to
truthful implementation of f˜ in rationalizable strategies. That is, it requires that
truth-telling be a rationalizable profile in a suitably defined direct mechanism for
an extended type space. Then, note how the proof expresses a new kind of “rev-
elation principle” once we work with the extended type space, a principle that
is consistent with the logic of rationalizability. In this light, each extended type
consists of a type in the original type space and a rationalizable action in the
implementing mechanism. Then, the “rationalizable mediator” recommends to
each extended type that it behave as its true original type and choose one of its
rationalizable actions, and each extended type obeys the recommendation. No-
tice how following the recommendation is a best response for each extended type,
given the beliefs that supported the recommended action as rationalizable in the
implementing mechanism.
For instance, in the example of Section 4, we have:
Fact 3 The SCS F in the example of Section 4 satisfies rationalizable incentive
compatibility.
This new fact follows from Theorem 1. In particular, the set of extended types
for agent 1 in the example is {m11,m21, . . . ,mK1 }, i.e., the set of the K actions, all
of them being rationalizable. In contrast, for agent 2, the set of extended types is
the following K + 1-element set: {(tα,m12), (tα,m22), . . . , (tα,mK2 ), (tβ,mK2 )}.
Remark: RIC can sometimes be violated. First, by Proposition 1, if we are
confined to SCFs, any SCF that violates BIC also violates RIC. For SCSs, the
following is an example that violates RIC. There are two states t and t
′
. Agent
1 is informed about the state, and agent 2 is not. There are three alternatives,
A = {a, b, c}. The utility values for agent 1 over A are u1(·, t) = (1, 2, 0) in state
t and u1(·, t′) = (2, 1, 0) in state t′ . The utility values for agent 2 over A are
all 0. Consider an SCS consisting of only two SCFs, both of which violate BIC:
F = {f, f ′}, where f(t) = a, f(t′) = b, f ′(t) = a, f ′(t′) = c. We claim that there
does not exist a mechanism that fully implements F in rationalizable strategies.
To see this, note that agent 2 will never be able to eliminate any message, given
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that he is indifferent among all outcomes. Suppose he is the “column player” in
the proposed mechanism. For agent 1, the “row player,” we must have that: (i)
in state t, only outcome a must happen, so she must be able to rationalize an
action, say the first row, where the only outcome is a; and (ii) in state t
′
, she must
rationalize other actions, say second row, where only b and c must feature, but
then, given her preferences in state t, she could not eliminate this row to leave only
the first one, because at least for a column, outcome b must show up there, which
is better than a in state t.
The next necessary condition is already featured in the literature on implemen-
tation in Bayesian equilibrium (Jackson (1991)). We need some preliminaries to
introduce it. For a belief-closed subspace E ⊆ T and an SCS F , define
F (E) ≡ {α ∈ ∆(A)∣∣ ∃ f ∈ F, ∃t ∈ E s.t. f(t) = α} .
The reader is referred to Section 2 for the definition of belief-closedness. For two
belief-closed subspaces E,E
′ ⊆ T and an SCS F , define
F (E×E ′) ≡
{
(α, α
′
) ∈ ∆(A)×∆(A)∣∣ ∃f, f ′ ∈ F, ∃t ∈ E,∃t′ ∈ E ′ s.t. f(t) = α and f ′(t′) = α′} .
Definition 6 An SCS F satisfies closure if, for any pair of belief-closed subspaces
E,E
′ ⊆ T , we have
F (E × E ′) = F (E)× F (E ′).
In words, closure says that new outcomes should not be added because of
any extra correlation between two belief-closed subspaces. This should apply to
rationalizable strategies, which should not depend upon such correlations, and
indeed, the next result shows that closure is a necessary condition for rationalizable
implementation:
Theorem 2 If an SCS F is (weakly or fully) implementable in rationalizable
strategies, it satisfies closure.
Remark: Note that every SCF trivially satisfies closure.
Proof : Suppose that the SCS F is (weakly or fully) implementable in rational-
izable strategies by the mechanism Γ = (M, g). Let E1, E2 be a pair of belief-closed
subspaces in T . By definition, it is easy to see that
F
(
E1 × E2) ⊆ F (E1)× F (E2) .
Therefore, it only remains to show the converse. That is,
F
(
E1 × E2) ⊇ F (E1)× F (E2) .
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By the definition of implementation, for each i ∈ N , there exists a pair of strategy
profiles σ1i ∈ Σi and σ2i ∈ Σi such that σ1(t) ∈ SΓ(T )(t) and g(σ1(t)) ∈ F (E1) for
every t ∈ E1; and σ2(t) ∈ SΓ(T )(t) and g(σ2(t)) ∈ F (E2) for each t ∈ E2. For each
i ∈ N , define σi as follows: for each t ∈ E1 ∪ E2,
σi(t) =
{
σ1i (t) if t ∈ E1
σ2i (t) if t ∈ E2
We claim that σ(t) ∈ SΓ(T )(t) for each t ∈ E1∪E2. Fix i ∈ N and ti ∈ E1i ∪E2i .
If ti ∈ E1i , there exists λ1i ∈ ∆(T−i ×M−i) such that (i) λ1i (t−i,m−i) > 0⇒ m−i ∈
S
Γ(T )
−i (t−i), (ii)
∑
m−i λ
1
i (t−i,m−i) = pii(ti)[t−i], and (iii)
σ1i (ti) ∈ arg max
m
′
i
∑
t−i,m−i
λ1i (t−i,m−i)ui(g(m
′
i,m−i); (ti, t−i))
Similarly, if ti ∈ E2i , there exists λ2i ∈ ∆(T−i ×M−i) such that (i) λ2i (t−i,m−i) >
0⇒ m−i ∈ SΓ(T )−i (t−i), (ii)
∑
m−i λ
2
i (t−i,m−i) = pii(ti)[t−i] and (iii)
σ2i (ti) ∈ arg max
m
′
i
∑
t−i,m−i
λ2i (t−i,m−i)ui(g(m
′
i,m−i); (ti, t−i))
Due to the construction of σi and the hypothesis that E
1 and E2 each are
belief-closed subspaces, there exists λi ∈ ∆(T−i ×M−i) such that∑
t−i,m−i
λi(t−i,m−i)ui(g(σi(ti),m−i); ti, t−i)
=
∑
t−i,m−i
λ1i (t−i,m−i)ui(g(m
′
i,m−i); (ti, t−i)) +
∑
t−i,m−i
λ2i (t−i,m−i)ui(g(m
′
i,m−i); (ti, t−i)).
This implies that (i) λi(t−i,m−i) > 0⇒ m−i ∈ SΓ(T )−i (t−i), (ii)
∑
m−i λi(t−i,m−i) =
pii(ti)[t−i], and (iii)
σi(ti) ∈ arg max
m
′
i
∑
t−i,m−i
λi(t−i,m−i)ui(g(m
′
i,m−i); (ti, t−i)).
This implies that σi(ti) ∈ SΓ(T )i (ti) for each ti ∈ E1i ∪E2i . Thus, σ(t) ∈ SΓ(T )(t)
for each t ∈ E1 ∪ E2. This allows us to conclude that g ◦ (σ1, σ2) ∈ F (E1 ∪ E2),
which completes the proof. 
For instance, the SCS F we consider in the example of Section 4 satisfies closure.
Moreover, we have:
Fact 4 Any SCS satisfies closure in the example of Section 4.
This follows simply because there are no two disjoint belief-closed subspaces in
the type space of the example.
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5.2 An Additional Necessary Condition for Full Implemen-
tation
For full implementation, additional monotonicity conditions are generally required
beyond incentive compatibility. We first recall Bayesian monotonicity (see Postle-
waite and Schmeidler (1986), Palfrey and Srivastava (1989), and Jackson (1991)).
Bayesian monotonicity is known to be a necessary condition for the full implemen-
tation of SCSs in Bayesian equilibrium.
Definition 7 An SCS F satisfies Bayesian monotonicity (BM) if, for every
f ∈ F and deception β, whenever for y : T−i → ∆(A) it holds that:
(∗)
[
Ui(f |t˜i) ≥ Ui(y|t˜i) ∀t˜i ∈ Ti
⇒ Ui(f ◦ β|ti) ≥ Ui(y ◦ β|ti)
]
,∀i ∈ N, ∀ti ∈ T ∗i ,
then f ◦ β ∈ F .
Below, we show that BM is not necessary for full implementation in rationaliz-
able strategies of SCSs. We present next a variant of BM, which does turn out to
be necessary:
Definition 8 An SCS F satisfies uniform Bayesian monotonicity (UBM)
if, for every deception β, whenever for y : T−i → ∆(A) it holds that:
(∗∗)
[
Ui(f |t˜i) ≥ Ui(y|t˜i) ∀t˜i ∈ Ti
⇒ Ui(f ◦ β|ti) ≥ Ui(y ◦ β|ti)
]
,∀f ∈ F, ∀i ∈ N, ∀ti ∈ T ∗i ,
then F ◦ β ⊆ F .
Remark: Note how, with respect to BM, the only difference is the order of quan-
tifiers in the clause “∀f ∈ F” regarding the appropriate inclusion of lower contour
sets; see Kunimoto and Serrano (2019) for a similar difference between Maskin
monotonicity and uniform monotonicity in complete information environments. It
follows that both BM and UBM coincide if one is dealing with SCFs.
Theorem 3 If an SCS F is fully implementable in rationalizable strategies, it
satisfies uniform Bayesian monotonicity.
Proof : Suppose that the SCS F is fully implementable in rationalizable strate-
gies by a mechanism Γ = (M, g). Fix a deception β satisfying condition (∗∗). We
show that F ◦ β ⊆ F .
We first show that SΓ(T ) ⊇ SΓ(β(T )), the latter being the set of relabeled strategy
profiles σ ◦ β for each rationalizable profile σ, when type ti pretends to be type
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βi(ti), for all ti ∈ Ti and all i ∈ N . Recall that b(SΓ(T )) = SΓ(T ), i.e., SΓ(T ) has
the best response property. Fix σ ∈ SΓ(T ) arbitrarily. This implies that for each
agent i ∈ N and type ti ∈ Ti, there exists λσi(ti)i ∈ ∆(T−i ×M−i) such that (1)
λσi,tii (t−i,m−i) > 0 ⇒ m−i ∈ SΓ(T )−i (t−i), (2)
∑
m−i λ
σi(ti)
i (m−i, t−i) = pii(ti)[t−i],
and (3) for all m
′
i ∈Mi,∑
t−i,m−i
λ
σi(ti)
i (t−i,m−i)ui(g(σi(ti),m−i); ti, t−i)
≥
∑
t−i,m−i
λ
σi(ti)
i (t−i,m−i)ui(g(m
′
i,m−i); ti, t−i).
We want to show that σi(βi(ti)) is also a best response against the suitably
relabeled λ
σi(βi(ti))
i . We focus on the best response property of σi summarized by
inequality (3). By the second requirement of implementability, we can assume that
there exists σ−i ∈ SΓ(T )−i such that λσi(ti)i (t−i, σ−i(t−i)) = 1 for each t−i ∈ T−i.8 Due
to the implementability of F , we have that g ◦ (σi, σ−i) ∈ F as an SCF, which we
denote by f . Define y = g ◦ (m′i, σ−i). Note that y is independent of agent i’s type.
Thus, we have
Ui(f |t˜i) ≥ Ui(y|t˜i)
for all t˜i ∈ Ti. Thus, using condition (∗∗), we also have
Ui(f ◦ β|ti) ≥ Ui(y ◦ β|ti).
For each (t−i,m−i) ∈ T−i ×M−i, define
λ
σi(βi(ti))
i (t−i,m−i) =
{
λ
σi(ti)
i (t−i, σ−i(β−i(t−i))) if m−i = σ−i(β−i(t−i))
0 otherwise.
By construction, we clearly satisfy
∑
m−i λ
σi(βi(ti))
i (t−i,m−i) = pii(ti)[t−i] for each
t−i ∈ T−i. Then Ui(f ◦ β|ti) ≥ Ui(y ◦ β|ti) implies that for any m′i ∈Mi,∑
t−i,m−i
λ
σi(βi(ti))
i (t−i,m−i)ui(g(σi(βi(ti)),m−i); ti, t−i)
≥
∑
t−i,m−i
λ
σi(βi(ti))
i (t−i,m−i)ui(g(m
′
i,m−i); ti, t−i).
This shows that σi ◦ βi is a best response against the suitably relabeled belief
λ
σi(βi(ti))
i . Since the choice of agent i and σi ∈ SΓ(T )i is arbitrary, we can conclude
that SΓ(β(T )) ⊆ SΓ(T ). Finally, by full implementability, this implies that
F (t) =
⋃
m∈SΓ(T )(t)
{g(m)} ⊇
⋃
m∈SΓ(β(T ))(t)
{g(m)} = F (β(t)).
8This requirement is unnecessary for the case of SCFs.
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The proof is thus complete. 
We can now revisit again the example we discussed in Section 4, in order to
illustrate the concepts just introduced. Here is a new result for it:
Fact 5 The SCS F in the example of Section 4 violates Bayesian monotonicity.
Proof : Consider a deception γ : T2 → T2 such that γ(tα) = γ(tβ) = tα.
Then, we have that for k 6= 2, K − 1, K, fk,K−1(t˜) = ak for each t˜ ∈ T2 so that
fk,K−1 ◦ γ /∈ F . We want to show that condition (∗) is satisfied for fk,K−1 and γ,
contradicting the conclusion of Bayesian monotonicity.
We check the following:
U2(fk,K−1|tα) = u2(ak, α) and U2(fk,K−1|tβ) = u2(aK−1, β).
The requirement that U2(fk,K−1|t˜) ≥ U2(y|t˜) for all t˜ ∈ T2 = {tα, tβ} concludes that
such y’s must be lotteries that assign positive probability only to {a1, a3, a4, . . . , ak−1, ak}.
(Indeed, the differences in utility values for agent 2 in state α can be chosen arbi-
trarily large for this to be true.) We thus get
U2(fk,K−1 ◦ γ|tα) = u2(ak, α) ≥ U2(y ◦ γ|tα)
U2(fk,K−1 ◦ γ|tβ) = u2(ak, β) ≥ U2(y ◦ γ|tβ),
This shows that condition (∗) holds for agent 2.
We now move on to agent 1. We compute the following:
U1(fk,K−1) = qαu1(ak) + (1− qα)u1(aK−1)
U1(y) = qαu1(y(tα)) + (1− qα)u1(y(tβ)).
We also compute the following:
U1(fk,K−1 ◦ γ) = qαu1(ak) + (1− qα)u1(ak) = u1(ak)
U1(y ◦ γ) = qαu1(y(tα)) + (1− qα)u1(y(tα)) = u1(y(tα)).
Then, condition (∗) for agent 1 can be translated into the following condition:
qα [u1(ak)− u1(y(tα))] + (1− qα) [u1(aK−1)− u1(y(tβ))] ≥ 0⇒ u1(ak) ≥ u1(y(tα)),
which of course holds since aK−1 is the bottom-ranked alternative for agent 1.
Hence, condition (∗) holds. We conclude that the SCS F violates Bayesian
monotonicity. 
Remark: If K is large, the example exhibits a severe failure of Bayesian mono-
tonicity, to the extent that many SCFs in the SCS violate its requirement.
However, we have the following:
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Fact 6 The SCS F in the example of Section 4 satisfies uniform Bayesian mono-
tonicity.
Proof : Given Fact 1, this follows from Theorem 3. 
As an illustration of the above fact, we offer the details of the argument for
a specific deception. Consider a deception γ2(tα) = γ2(tβ) = tα and an SCF
f2,K−1 ∈ F . Since we have f2,K−1(γ2(tα)) = f2,K−1(γ2(tβ)) = a2, it follows that
f2,K−1 ◦ γ /∈ F . Consider a lottery y satisfying
(A) U2(f2,K−1|tα) ≥ U2(y|tα) and U2(f2,K−1|tβ) ≥ U2(y|tβ).
Clearly, such a lottery y exists because f2,K−1 specifies the second-best outcome
in each state for agent 2, i.e., a2 for type tα and aK−1 for type tβ. For example,
y = a3 satisfies condition (A).
However, if condition (∗∗) in the definition of uniform Bayesian monotonicity
were to hold, we must satisfy
(B) U2(f2,K−1 ◦ γ|tα) ≥ U2(y ◦ γ|tα) and U2(f2,K−1 ◦ γ|tβ) ≥ U2(y ◦ γ|tβ),
which is not true for y = a3 and type tβ. In other words, the change in preferences
from state α to state β facilitates the existence of preference reversals, which make
condition (∗∗) hard to meet.
6 Sufficient Conditions for Rationalizable Imple-
mentation in General Environments
In this section, we present a very general sufficiency result for full implementation
in rationalizable strategies.
For each SCF f ∈ F, define
Yi[f ] ≡
{
yi : T−i → ∆∗(A)|Ui(f |t˜i) ≥ Ui(yi|t˜i) ∀t˜i ∈ T ∗i
}
.
The set Yi[f ] describes the SCFs that are not better than the SCF f for agent i,
regardless of his type.9 Since both T−i and ∆∗(A) are finite, the set Yi[f ] becomes
finite.10
Definition 9 An SCS F satisfies the no-worst-rule (NWR) condition if, for
each f ∈ F , i ∈ N , ti ∈ T ∗i , and ψi ∈ ∆(T−i × T−i), there exist two SCFs
9Here we adopt the notation from Oury and Tercieux (2012).
10In the appendix (Section A.3.3), we argue how to dispense with the finiteness of these sets.
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yi[f ; ti, ψi], y
′
i[f ; ti, ψi] ∈ Yi[f ] such that∑
t−i,t
′
−i
ψi(t
′
−i, t−i)ui(y
′
i[f ; ti, ψi](t
′
−i); (ti, t−i)) >
∑
t−i,t
′
−i
ψi(t
′
−i, t−i)ui(yi[f ; ti, ψi](t
′
−i); (ti, t−i)).
Using the example of Section 4, we confirm below that NWR is not necessary
for implementation in rationalizable strategies.
Fact 7 The SCS F in the example of Section 4 violates NWR.
To see this, take the SCF fK−1,K−1 ∈ F , which assigns outcome aK−1 in both
states. Since aK−1 is the worst outcome in both states for agent 1, the SCS F
violates NWR. Nevertheless, by Fact 1, we know that the SCS F is implementable
in rationalizable strategies.
Since Ti is finite, we define {t`i}∞`=1 as a countable support of ∆(T−i). Similarly,
since T−i is countable, one can find {ψki }∞k=1 as a countable support of ∆(T−i×T−i).
More precisely, every ψki is defined as a degenerate measure over T−i × T−i.
Since F satisfies NWR, for each f ∈ F and i ∈ N , we define the uniform SCF
y¯i[f ] as follows: there exist δ, η ∈ (0, 1) such that:
y¯i[f ] ≡ (1− δ)(1− η)
2
∞∑
`=1
η`−1
∞∑
k=1
δk−1
{
y
′
i[f ; t
`
i , ψ
k
i ] + yi[f ; t
`
i , ψ
k
i ]
}
.
We use this uniform SCF y¯i[f ] in the canonical mechanism proposed later.
We also use the following result later, an implication of NWR:
Lemma 1 Suppose that an SCS F satisfies NWR. Then, for all i ∈ N , ti ∈ T ∗i ,
and φi ∈ ∆(T−i), there exist two lotteries (or constant SCFs) αi[ti, φi], α′i[ti, φi] ∈
∆∗(A) such that∑
t−i
φi(t−i)ui(α
′
i[ti, φi]; (ti, t−i)) >
∑
t−i
φi(t−i)ui(αi[ti, φi]; (ti, t−i)).
Proof : The proof can be found in Kunimoto (2019). 
Following the previous argument, we denote by {t`i}∞`=1 the countable support
of Ti and by {φki }∞k=1 the countable support of T−i, respectively. More precisely,
each φki is a degenerate probability measure on T−i. For each i ∈ N , we define the
uniform lottery α¯i ∈ ∆∗(A) as follows: there exist δ, η ∈ (0, 1) such that
α¯i ≡ (1− δ)(1− η)
2
∞∑
`=1
η`−1
∞∑
k=1
δk−1
{
α
′
i[t
`
i , φ
k
i ] + αi[t
`
i , φ
k
i ]
}
.
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Finally, we define
α¯ ≡ 1
n
∑
i∈N
α¯i.
We also use this uniform lottery α¯ in the canonical mechanism.
The next two weak conditions are the last ones used in the general sufficiency
theorem:
Definition 10 An SCS F satisfies the minimal conflict-of-interests (MCI)
condition if there do not exist β ∈ B and f ∈ F ◦ β such that |F ◦ β| ≥ 2 and
f ∈ arg maxf˜∈F◦β Ui(f˜ |ti) for each i ∈ N and ti ∈ Ti.
Definition 11 An SCS F satisfies responsiveness to deceptions (RD) if
there exists no deception β ∈ B such that F ◦ β ⊆ F .
Using the example of Section 4, we confirm below that MCI and RD are not
necessary for implementation in rationalizable strategies.
Fact 8 The SCS F in the example of Section 4 violates MCI. It also violates RD.
To see that MCI is violated, consider a deception β2(tα) = β2(tβ) = tα and
the SCF fK,K ∈ F , which assigns outcome aK in both states. We observe that
|F ◦ β| ≥ 2 and fK,K ∈ F . However, since aK is the best outcome for both agents
in both states, we have fK,K ∈ arg maxf˜∈F◦β Ui(f˜ |ti) for each i ∈ N and ti ∈ Ti,
which contradicts MCI.
Next, to see that RD is violated, consider a deception β2(tα) = β2(tβ) = tα and
the SCF f1,K−1 ∈ F . Then, we have that f1,K−1 ◦ β = f1,1, which assigns outcome
a1 in both states. However, f1,1 /∈ F , which contradicts RD.
Assume that the SCS F satisfies (fully) rationalizable incentive compatibility
(fully RIC). Then, there exist an expanded type space T = (Ti, Ti, tˆi, pˆii)i∈N and
an extended SCF f˜ : T → ∆(A) such that the identity mapping I : T → T
constitutes a rationalizable profile in the associated direct mechanism ΓDR(T , f˜)
and f˜ ◦ tˆ−1 ≈ F .
For the sufficiency result we establish below, we propose the following mech-
anism Γ = (M, g): each agent i sends a message mi = (m
1
i ,m
2
i ,m
3
i ,m
4
i ,m
5
i ,m
6
i ),
where
• m1i ∈ Ti, an extended type for agent i;
• m2i ∈ F , i.e., a social choice function, understood as a recommendation to
the designer;
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• m3i = (m3i [1],m3i [2]) where m3i [1] : T−i → ∆∗(A) and m3i [2] ∈ F , understood
as potential arguments for a challenge to the designer;
• m4i ∈ ∆∗(A), i.e., a state-independent allocation, also understood as a chal-
lenge to the designer;
• m5i ∈ N , i.e., a number chosen from {1, . . . , n}, understood as a vote for
some person to be the king;
• and m6i ∈ N, i.e., a positive integer.
The outcome function g : M → ∆(A) is defined as follows: for each m ∈M :
Rule 1. Consensus implements the recommendation made by the elected
king: If m6i = 1 for all i ∈ N , then g(m) = f(tˆ(m1)), where f = m2k and
k = (
∑
j∈N m
5
j) (mod n+ 1).
Rule 2. An odd man out: If m6j = 1 for all j 6= i and m6i > 1, then the following
subrules apply:
Rule 2-1. A nongreedy odd man out is heard in his challenge, although
some bad outcomes –cost of challenge– are also implemented in the
appeal process: If Ui(m
2
k|t˜i) ≥ Ui(m3i [1]|t˜i) for all t˜i ∈ Ti and m2k = m3i [2] where
k = (
∑
j∈N m
5
j) (mod n+ 1), then
g(m) =
{
m3i [1](tˆ−i(m
1
−i)) with probability m
6
i /(m
6
i + 1)
y¯i[m
2
k](tˆ−i(m
1
−i)) with probability 1/(m
6
i + 1)
Rule 2-2. A greedy odd man out is not heard in his challenge, although
some bad outcomes –cost of the challenge– are also implemented in the
appeal process: Otherwise,
g(m) =
{
m2k(tˆ(m
1)) with probability m6i /(m
6
i + 1)
y¯i[m
2
k](tˆ−i(m
1
−i)) with probability 1/(m
6
i + 1)
where k = (
∑
j∈N m
5
j) (mod n+ 1).
Rule 3. Stronger disagreements lead to an integer game, implementing
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potential disarray in the appeal/challenge process: In all other cases,
g(m) =

m41 with probability
m61
n(m61+1)
m42 with probability
m62
n(m62+1)
...
...
m4n with probability
m6n
n(m6n+1)
α¯ with the remaining probability,
We are finally ready to state the general sufficiency result for full implementa-
tion in rationalizable strategies:
Theorem 4 If an SCS F satisfies fully rationalizable incentive compatibility, uni-
form Bayesian monotonicity, closure, NWR, MCI, and RD, it is fully imple-
mentable in rationalizable strategies.
Proof : The proof is in the appendix (Section A.1). 
A simple sketch of the proof is this. The proof is based on four steps. Step
1 uses the integer game in Rule 3 and NWR to show that, in all rationalizable
messages, the integer announced in m6i must be 1. Basically, Rules 2 or 3 cannot
happen with positive probability, because if they did, an agent would find a better
response by announcing a higher integer than he initially announces. Step 2 follows
then easily, stating that any belief used to support rationalizable messages must
put probability 1 on Rule 1. Step 3 uses (fully) RIC to establish that, for every
f ∈ F , there exist rationalizable messages whose induced SCF is f . Finally, in Step
4, RD and UBM are used to obtain a key preference reversal, for any deception
β – this preference reversal is obtained for free in the economic environments of
Section 7. The preference reversal identifies a test-agent and a test-allocation that
he would like to impose. Such a reversal, along with MCI, allows us to construct
a profitable deviation from Rule 1, by allowing the test-agent with the reversal to
impose the test-allocation that benefits him. This last argument establishes that
any rationalizable outcome must be in the SCS F , which concludes the proof.
Remark: Theorem 4 also applies to environments with two agents. In contrast,
our result for complete-information environments, in Kunimoto and Serrano (2019),
is proved for the case of at least three agents, because, as is usual in those settings,
we construct a mechanism that relies on the report of the entire state. With RIC,
we get around that issue here.
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7 Economic Environments
In this section, we propose a class of well-studied economic environments in which
all the additional conditions used in Theorem 4, such as UBM, NWR, MCI, and
RD can be dispensed with. It follows that, in this class of environments, RIC is
essentially the only relevant condition for rationalizable implementation.
7.1 First Price Auctions under Independent Private Values
Although the result in this section can be extended to many other economic en-
vironments, to fix ideas, we work with a well-known auction setting. We define
an environment that is tied to a specific trading institution (in this case, an inde-
pendent private-values first-price auction for two bidders – see, e.g., Battigalli and
Siniscalchi (2003)). Let N = {1, 2} be the set of agents. Let Ti = [0, 1] for i = 1, 2
be the set of agent i’s types or valuations, drawn independently from a continuous
probability distribution. Let A denote the set of outcomes, defined as follows:
A = {(1, p), (0, 0)}p∈[0,1] ∪ {(0, 0), (1, p)}p∈[0,1]
such that there exist bidding strategies σi : Ti 7→ [0, 1], i = 1, 2, so that agent
i of type ti gets the good with probability one if and only if p = σi(ti) > σj(tj)
and pays a price p. That is, either agent 1 gets the object paying potentially any
price p ∈ [0, 1], while agent 2 does not get the object and pays nothing, or vice
versa, always obeying the rules of the first-price auction. Of course, the set A is
endowed with its sigma-algebra A containing all singleton sets. Let ∆(A) be the
set of probability measures over this measurable space.
In this economic environment, under a very weak regularity assumption that is
satisfied by standard bidding strategies, we can establish the following characteri-
zation of SCSs that are implementable in rationalizable strategies:
Theorem 5 Suppose that an SCS F contains a continuous SCF f ∈ F such that
for every agent i = 1, 2, (i) Ui(f |0) = 0, and (ii) for ti ∈ (0, 1], Ui(f |ti) > 0. Then,
the SCS F is implementable in rationalizable strategies if and only if it satisfies
rationalizable incentive compatibility and closure.
Proof of Theorem 5: The proof is in the appendix (Section A.2). 
We provide a sketch of the proof. The necessity of RIC and closure has been
established in Theorems 1 and 2, respectively. Sufficiency follows from the general
sufficiency theorem, i.e., Theorem 4, found in Section 6 and extended in Section
A.3 in the appendix to environments where type spaces are compact subsets of Eu-
clidean spaces, after taking into account the following observations. In economic
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environments, as usual, the minimal conflict of interest (MCI) condition is trivially
satisfied: after the assumed existence of the SCF f , if the SCS F contains addi-
tional SCFs, there is no SCF that can simultaneously be the maximizer of every
type and every agent’s expected utility within F , given the definition of the set
of alternatives in the first-price auction. Furthermore, the no worst rule (NWR)
condition, used to impose bad outcomes after deviations, can be dispensed with
in economic environments as well, by always using the “Zero” outcome, i.e., an
outcome where the good is allocated to the deviating agent with probability zero.
The heart of the proof of Theorem 5 lies in Proposition 4, which is presented and
proved in Section A.1. This proposition establishes that, in these environments,
after any deception that the agents might use, there always exists a test-agent and
a test-pair of SCFs that can help the designer circumvent the deception. That
is, around the assumed f , there exists an agent i, a type ti, and an SCF y such
that type ti prefers f over y if agents are not using any deception, but has the
opposite preference when the deception is used. This fundamental fact for these
environments implies that uniform Bayesian monotonicity (UBM), an additional
necessary condition for full implementability in rationalizable strategies, is trivially
satisfied. Moreover, the existence of that preference reversal also lets one dispense
with the responsiveness to deceptions (RD) condition, which is the last assump-
tion in Theorem 4. It follows then from Theorem 4 that rationalizable incentive
compatibility (RIC) and closure are sufficient for implementability in rationalizable
strategies.
In these environments, the type space T =
∏
i∈N Ti is belief-closed, and hence,
closure can be obviated. We conclude, therefore, that implementability in ratio-
nalizable strategies is equivalent to RIC.
To illustrate our analysis, we revisit Battigalli and Siniscalchi (2003, Section 2),
who identify the set of rationalizable bidding strategies in the independent, private-
values, first-price auction. For example, for the case of the uniform probability
distribution on [0, 1], the set of rationalizable strategies consists of: σi(0) = 0 and
σi(ti) ∈ (0, ti/2] for ti ∈ (0, 1]. (Recall that the Bayesian equilibrium consists of
σi(ti) = ti/2 for i = 1, 2 and for all ti in this case.) This identifies a set of SCFs,
each of which is associated with each agent using one of the bidding strategies in
this rationalizable set. Now, it follows from Theorem 5, and from the fact that
closure can be obviated, that the set of SCFs identified by Battigalli and Siniscalchi
(2003) is the maximal SCSs that can be implemented in rationalizable strategies,
whatever the mechanism one uses. To see this, note that, if one had an SCF outside
of the Battigalli-Siniscalchi set that is also supported by rationalizable strategies
in some mechanism, given the way we have defined the set A of outcomes, by RIC,
the “revelation principle” embodied in our Theorem 1, such an SCF would have
to be rationalizable in the first-price auction, contrary to what we are assuming.
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7.2 Multidimensional Signals
Following Krishna and Perry (2000), one can use the same proof in order to get a
sense of the large class of economic environments for which we can establish Theo-
rem 5. These are not necessarily tied to a specific trading institution. Indeed, there
is a finite set K of social alternatives. Each agent i then has a K-dimensional type
ti = (ti(1), ti(2), . . . , ti(K)) ∈ RK . The payoff to agent i of type ti for alternative k
is quasilinear, that is, it is of the form: ti(k)− xi, where xi is a monetary transfer
made by i to the planner. The environment to be considered is thus one of private
values. We assume that for all i ∈ N , Ti is a nonempty compact and convex subset
of RK . We also assume the existence of a type ti ∈ Ti for each i ∈ N such that ti is
the “most reluctant” type of agent i in the sense that his gain from participating
in the mechanism is the least among all types of agent i. We call ti the zero type
for agent i. Then, each SCS F to be considered contains an SCF f for which the
zero type of each agent i obtains zero expected utility (Ui(f |ti) = 0) and every
nonzero type obtains positive expected utility (Ui(f |ti) > 0 for every ti 6= ti).
Moving beyond private values, Jehiel and Moldovanu (2001) presents a remark-
able impossibility result for environments with multidimensional signals. Indeed,
in their settings, no efficient rule is Bayesian incentive compatible. We can illus-
trate our approach by constructing a simple mechanism to show that efficient rules
can be part of SCSs satisfying RIC, allowing their implementation in rationalizable
strategies. We describe the elements of Example 4.4 in their paper, on which we
base our construction.
There are two agents i = 1, 2 and three alternatives k = A,B,C. Suppose that
only agent 1 receives a signal, denoted by s = (sA, sB, sC). Let S denote the set of
signals, assumed to be a compact and convex subset of R3+.
Assume the set of agents’ valuations is such that alternative C is never efficient,
say v1(C, s) = v2(C, s) = 0 for all s ∈ S, whereas for all s ∈ S, vi(A, s) ≥ 0 and
vi(B, s) ≥ 0 for i = 1, 2. Moreover, we have that vi(A, s) = vi(B, s) = 0 if and
only if s = (0, 0, 0) for i = 1, 2. So, excluding the trivial signal s = (0, 0, 0), either
only alternative A is efficient, only alternative B is efficient, or both alternatives
A and B are efficient.
Denote by SA ⊆ S the set of signals for which A is the only efficient alternative,
i.e.,
SA = {s ∈ S : v1(A, s) + v2(A, s) > v1(B, s) + v2(B, s)}.
Similarly, let SB ⊆ S be the set of signals for which B is the only efficient alterna-
tive, i.e.,
SB = {s ∈ S : v1(B, s) + v2(B, s) > v1(A, s) + v2(A, s)}.
And let SAB = S \ (SA ∪SB), where both A and B are efficient. This third set has
zero measure in S.
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We only care about agent 1’s misrepresentation of her type to the extent that
it induces a distinct alternative which is not efficient under a true signal profile.
That is, if we were concerned with allocative efficiency, we would like an SCS
F containing only SCFs f such that f(s) = A – and perhaps some monetary
transfers – whenever s ∈ SA, and f(s) = B – and perhaps some monetary transfers–
whenever s ∈ SB. Over the set SAB, the SCF f could assign either alternative A
or B, again with some transfers.
Consider the following mechanism. Agent 1’s message set is the set of her
signals S. Agent 2 can “veto” (V) or “not veto” (NV) the interaction. The outcome
function is as follows:
• If agent 2 chooses NV, we listen to the report of agent 1, say sˆ. Then, (i)
the outcome is alternative A if sˆ ∈ SA ∪ SAB and agent 2 makes a transfer
v2(A, sˆ) to agent 1; and (ii) the outcome is alternative B if sˆ ∈ SB and agent
2 makes a transfer v2(B, sˆ) to agent 1.
• If agent 2 chooses V, alternative C is implemented and there are no transfers.
It is easy to see that, in this mechanism, all messages are rationalizable, as
we argue next. If agent 2 believes that agent 1 is not misrepresenting her signal,
this gives agent 2 an ex-post zero payoff against the type who receives that signal.
Thus, if agent 2 believes that agent 1’s strategy is truth-telling for all signals, his
expected payoff from the NV action is zero. Clearly, his expected payoff from
choosing his V action is also zero. Thus, he is at a best response by choosing either
message. For agent 1, any strategy is a best response if she believes that agent 2 is
choosing V with probability 1. Thus, truth-telling as well as any deception can be
rationalized by agent 1. These arguments already establish that the entire interim
efficient frontier may arise as a result of rationalizable play in this mechanism,
although there are also inefficient outcomes that are part of the rationalizable set.
Suppose s ∈ SA ∪ SAB. Let D−(s) be the following set of reports sˆ: sˆ ∈ D−(s)
whenever sˆ ∈ SA ∪ SAB and v2(A, sˆ) < v2(A, s). Similarly, let D+(s) be the set of
reports sˆ ∈ SA such that v2(A, sˆ) ≥ v2(A, s). Also, let D′−(s) be the set of reports
sˆ ∈ SB such that
v1(B, s) + v2(B, sˆ) < v1(A, s) + v2(A, s).
and let D′+(s) be the set of reports sˆ ∈ SB such that
v1(B, s) + v2(B, sˆ) ≥ v1(A, s) + v2(A, s).
Note how the outcome of truth-telling is the efficient rule that maximizes 1’s
payoff leaving a zero payoff to agent 2. But in addition, any efficient rule can
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arise in rationalizable play when agent 1 uses deceptions in the set D−(s), and
hence transfering some of the available surplus to agent 2. Deceptions that uti-
lize the other sets just defined, such as D+(s), D
′
−(s), and D
′
+(x), will result in
inefficiencies.
This “anything goes” mechanism just starts to scratch the surface of possi-
bilities, in terms of implementing efficiency as the outcome of rationalizable play.
There will surely be other mechanisms that deliver a more refined outcome, perhaps
getting rid of all inefficiencies; they are beyond our current scope.
8 The Case of Social Choice Functions
In this section, we confine our attention to SCFs and investigate the implications of
their rationalizable implementation. In the process, we clarify some results in the
literature. First, we recall the definition of Bayesian monotonicity, particularized
for SCFs, but stated in its contrapositive form, in order to enhance the comparison
with the next condition, presented hereafter:
Definition 12 An SCF f satisfies Bayesian monotonicity (BM) if, for every
deception β, whenever f ◦ β 6≈ f , there exist i ∈ N , ti ∈ T ∗i , and y∗ : T−i → ∆(A)
such that: [
Ui(y
∗ ◦ β|ti) > Ui(f ◦ β|ti)
and Ui(f |t˜i) ≥ Ui(y|t˜i) ∀t˜i ∈ Ti
]
.
Oury and Tercieux (2012) introduces the notion of interim rationalizable mono-
tonicity, and shows it to be an implication of continuous implementation in their
setting. To define this condition, let βi : Ti → 2Ti\{∅} be a set-valued deception
of agent i and we call β = (β1, . . . , βn) a set-valued deception. We say f ◦ β ≈ f
if, for all t, t
′ ∈ T ∗, whenever t′ ∈ β(t), f(t) = f(t′). Otherwise, we say f ◦ β 6≈ f ,
and we refer to such deceptions as unacceptable deceptions. Then, we introduce
the following condition.
Definition 13 (Oury and Tercieux (2012)) An SCF f satisfies interim ra-
tionalizable monotonicity (IRM) if, for every set-valued deception β for which
f ◦ β 6≈ f , there exist i ∈ N, ti ∈ T ∗i , and t′i ∈ βi(ti) such that for every
ψi ∈ ∆(T−i × T−i) satisfying
1. ψi(t−i, t
′
−i) > 0⇒ t′−i ∈ β−i(t−i),
2.
∑
t
′
−i
ψi(t−i, t
′
−i) = pii(ti)[t−i],
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there exists an SCF y∗ : T−i → ∆(A) such that∑
t−i,t
′
−i
ψi(t−i, t
′
−i)ui(y
∗(t
′
−i); (ti, t−i)) >
∑
t−i,t
′
−i
ψi(t−i, t
′
−i)ui(f(t
′
i, t
′
−i); (ti, t−i));
and for all t˜i ∈ T ∗i ,∑
t−i
pii(t˜i)[t−i]ui(f(t˜i, t−i); (t˜i, t−i)) ≥
∑
t−i
pii(t˜i)[t−i]ui(y∗(t−i); (t˜i, t−i)).
The following results can be found also in Oury and Tercieux (2012):
Proposition 2 If an SCF f satisfies interim rationalizable monotonicity, it also
satisfies SIRBIC, and hence, also Bayesian incentive compatibility.
Proof: It follows from Lemma 3 of Oury and Tercieux (2012). 
Proposition 3 If an SCF f satisfies interim rationalizable monotonicity, it also
satisfies Bayesian monotonicity.
Proof:11 Consider a single-valued deception β and suppose that there exists a
state t ∈ T ∗ such that f ◦ β(t) 6= f(t). Hence, β is such that f ◦ β 6≈ f . Then,
notice that, by IRM, using the fact that β is single-valued, we can get rid of the
mapping ψi, and conclude that there exists an SCF y
∗ : T−i → ∆(A) such that∑
t−i
pii(t−i|ti)ui(y∗(β−i(t−i); (ti, t−i)) >
∑
t−i
pii(t−i|ti)ui(f(β(t); (ti, t−i));
and for all t˜i ∈ T ∗i ,∑
t−i
pii(t˜i)[t−i]ui(f(t˜i, t−i); (t˜i, t−i)) ≥
∑
t−i
pii(t˜i)[t−i]ui(y∗(t−i); (t˜i, t−i)).
Hence, we have found the necessary preference reversal, as specified in the require-
ment of Bayesian monotonicity. 
Notice that Bayesian monotonicity does not necessarily imply interim rational-
izable monotonicity. To understand the reason, let us consider an SCF satisfying
BM. To prove that it satisfies IRM, consider an unacceptable set-valued deception
β. There exists a single-valued selection βˆ of β which is also unacceptable. So
indeed this single-valued selection βˆ can be undermined as required in IRM using
11To better follow the development of the examples in this section, it is useful to provide this
proof here.
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BM. That is, there exist i, ti, and t
′
i = βˆi(ti) for which the requirements of IRM
are satisfied for the unique belief ψˆi that is consistent with the single-valued de-
ception βˆ−i. But this is not enough to argue that i, ti, and t
′
i ∈ βi(ti) satisfy the
requirements of IRM for all beliefs ψi that are consistent with the set-valued β−i.
This may end up being too strong a requirement.
And indeed, the next example makes exactly this point:
Example 1 The following SCF f satisfies BM, but violates IRM. We write down
the example starting to describe only one agent called agent 1, who is informed of
the state, but we add an uninformed agent when needed to complete the argument.
There are two states T = {t, t′}. There are four pure outcomes A = {a, b, c, d}.
Let f(t) = a and f(t
′
) = b. The Bernoulli utility function of the informed agent,
whom we call agent 1, is given as follows:
u(a, t) = 3;u(b, t) = 1;u(c, t) = 2;u(d, t) = 4;
u(a, t
′
) = 3;u(b, t
′
) = 2;u(c, t
′
) = 1;u(d, t
′
) = 4.
Note that the SCF f violates BIC (which coincides with RIC for SCFs), and
hence, it is not implementable either in rationalizable strategies or in Bayesian
equilibrium. That the SCF f fails BIC implies that it also violates IRM, which is
implied by Proposition 2 above (Lemma 3 in Oury and Tercieux (2012)). But we
find it instructive, in this and the next example, to show this violation explicitly.
Also, as will be shown, the SCF f satisfies BM. Serrano and Vohra (2001) shows
by means of examples that there are many nonconstant SCFs satisfying BIC, while
only constant SCFs satisfy BM. Hence, we can conclude that BIC and BM are
logically independent.
Let us thus show that the SCF f satisfies BM. Recall that it suffices that the
SCF y∗ chosen in the prerequisite for BM be constant in this case. There are three
single-valued deceptions to consider:
• β1(t) = t′ and β1(t′) = t. Then, the test-agent is agent 1, the test-type is
t and the SCF creating a reversal is y∗ = c. To see this, we display the
following expected utilities of agent 1:
U1(f ◦ β1|t) = u(b, t) = 1 < 2 = u(c, t) = U1(y∗ ◦ β1|t)
U1(f |t) = u(a, t) = 3 > 2 = u(c, t) = U1(y∗|t)
U1(f |t′) = u(b, t′) = 2 > 1 = u(c, t′) = U1(y∗|t′)
• β2(t) = β2(t′) = t. Add agent 2 with a Bernoulli utility function v, who
is uninformed about the state, and for whom her expected utilities, calculated
using a uniform probability distribution over the states, are based on v(a, t) =
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1, v(b, t
′
) = 3 –which are the Bernoulli utilities of the nonmanipulated SCF–,
completed with v(a, t
′
) = 1, and v(d, t) = v(d, t
′
) = 1.5. The other utility
values are not needed for now. Then, the test-agent is agent 2 and the SCF
y∗ = d. To see this, we display the following expected utilities of agent 2:
U2(f ◦ β2) = 1
2
v(a, t) +
1
2
v(a, t
′
) = 1 < 1.5 =
1
2
v(d, t) +
1
2
v(d, t
′
) = U2(y
∗ ◦ β2)
U2(f) =
1
2
v(a, t) +
1
2
v(b, t
′
) = 2 > 1.5 =
1
2
v(d, t) +
1
2
v(d, t
′
) = U2(y
∗)
• β3(t) = β3(t′) = t′. Now, the test-agent is again agent 1, the test-type is
t, and the test-SCF y∗ = c. To see this, we display the following expected
utilities of agent 1:
U1(f ◦ β3|t) = u(b, t) = 1 < 2 = u(c, t) = U1(y∗ ◦ β3|t)
U1(f |t) = u(a, t) = 3 > 2 = u(c, t) = U1(y∗|t)
U1(f |t′) = u(b, t′) = 2 > 1 = u(c, t′) = U1(y∗|t′)
Hence, for each single-valued deception, we have found the preference reversal
required by BM. Thus, BM is satisfied.
To argue that the SCF f violates IRM, consider the following set-valued de-
ception β = {β1, β2}: β1(t) = {t} and β2(t′) = {t, t′}. This set-valued deception
cannot be undermined as per the requirements of IRM. Agent 2 does not have the
required preference reversal for all beliefs ψ2 that are consistent with this deception
because one such belief is that agent 1 is truthful, i.e., ψ2(t, t) = ψ2(t
′
, t
′
) = 1/2,
and hence, it is impossible to have U2(y) > U2(f) ≥ U2(y). Agent 1 can hold only
one possible belief about agent 2, that is, agent 2 is truth-telling since he has a
unique type. Now, consider type t of agent 1 and t ∈ β(t). Clearly, there does not
exist any lottery y ∈ ∆({a, b, c, d}) such that U1(y|t) = u(y, t) > u(f(t)|t) = U1(f |t)
and U1(f |t) = u(f(t), t) ≥ u(y, t) = U1(y|t). Next, consider type t′ of agent 1 and
t
′ ∈ β(t′). Again, there does not exist any lottery y such that U1(y|t′) = u(y, t′) >
u(f(t
′
), t
′
) = U1(f |t′) and U1(f |t′) = u(f(t′)|t′) ≥ u(y|t′) = U1(y|t′). Finally, con-
sider type t
′
of agent 1 and t ∈ β(t′). There does not exist any lottery y such that
U1(y|t′) = u(y, t′) > u(f(t), t′) = U1(f |t′) and U1(f |t′) = u(f(t′), t′) ≥ u(y, t′) =
U1(y|t′). Thus, the unacceptable set-valued deception β cannot be undermined, and
IRM is violated.
Our next task is to understand whether IRM is equivalent to BIC and BM
imposed together. We already know, by Propositions 2 and 3, that IRM implies
BIC and BM. However, the next example, a variant of Example 1, demonstrates
that the opposite implication is not true:
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Example 2 The following SCF f satisfies BIC and BM, but violates IRM.
There are two states t and t
′
. There are four pure outcomes {a, b, c, d}. Let
f(t) = a and f(t
′
) = b.
There are two agents, agent 1 with a Bernoulli utility function u and agent 2
with v, respectively. Agent 1 is informed, and agent 2 is uninformed, assigning
equal probability to either state.
The utility function u of the informed agent (agent 1) is as follows:
u(a, t) = 3;u(b, t) = 1;u(c, t) = 2;u(d, t) = 4;
u(a, t
′
) = 3;u(b, t
′
) = 3;u(c, t
′
) = 1;u(d, t
′
) = −1.
Note that f now satisfies BIC (recall that BIC coincides with RIC for SCFs).
The Bernoulli utilities of the uninformed agent (agent 2) are denoted by v.
They are identical to the ones in Example 1:
v(a, t) = 1; v(b, t) = 0; v(c, t) = 0; v(d, t) = 1.5;
v(a, t
′
) = 1; v(b, t
′
) = 3; v(c, t
′
) = 0; v(d, t
′
) = 1.5.
Similarly to Example 1, let us first check that f satisfies BM. Again, recall that
it suffices that the proposed SCF y∗ in the BM condition be constant in this case.
There are three single-valued deceptions to consider:
• β1(t) = t′ and β1(t′) = t. Then, the test-agent is 1, the test-type is t and
the SCF creating a reversal is y∗ = c. To see this, we display the following
utilities:
U1(f ◦ β1|t) = u(b, t) = 1 < 2 = u(c, t) = U1(y∗ ◦ β1|t)
U1(f |t) = u(a, t) = 3 > 2 = u(c, t) = U1(y∗|t)
U1(f |t′) = u(b, t′) = 3 > 1 = u(c, t′) = U1(y∗|t′).
• β2(t) = β2(t′) = t. Then, the test-agent is agent 2 and the SCF y∗ = d.
We omit the computations, as they are identical to the ones in the previous
example.
• β3(t) = β3(t′) = t′. Now, the test-agent is again agent 1, the test-type is t,
and the test-SCF y∗ = c. To see this, we display the following utilities:
U1(f ◦ β3|t) = u(b, t) = 1 < 2 = u(c, t) = U1(y∗ ◦ β3|t)
U1(f |t) = u(a, t) = 3 > 2 = u(c, t) = U1(y∗|t)
U1(f |t′) = u(b, t′) = 3 > 1 = u(c, t′) = U1(y∗|t′).
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Thus, as in the previous example, for each single-valued deception, we have found
the preference reversal required by BM. Therefore, BM is satisfied.
Also exactly as in Example 1, one can argue that the SCF f violates IRM, using
again the same unacceptable set-valued deception.
Example 2 is important, as it shows that IRM is not a necessary condition
for rationalizable implementation.12 Indeed, the SCF in the example satisfies BIC
(equivalent to RIC for SCFs), BM (equivalent to UBM for SCFs), closure, MCI,
NWR (because of alternative c), and RD.13 By our main sufficiency theorem (The-
orem 4), the SCF in the example is implementable in rationalizable strategies.
It is possible, of course, that a simpler mechanism can be constructed for this
specific example. Although we have not found it, we come close to doing that.
The next mechanism approximately implements the SCF f in Example 2 in ra-
tionalizable strategies (or in (strict) Bayesian equilibrium). Let agent 1’s message
set be M1 = {t, t′}. Let M2 = {(T, L), (T,R), (B,L), (B,R)}, where T stands for
“Top,” B for “Bottom,” L for “Left,” and R for “Right.” The outcome function
is described in the following two tables; agent 1 chooses over tables, and agent 2
chooses over the four cells in the table (choosing, of course, the same cell across
both tables). Let  > 0 be arbitrarily small:
Agent 1 chooses t Agent 2
L R
Agent 2 T d (1− )a+ d
B d d
Agent 1 chooses t
′
Agent 2
L R
Agent 2 T c b
B c c
Note how it is a strictly dominant strategy for each of the informed types of
agent 1 to announce the truthful message. Given that, in the second round of
elimination, agent 2’s unique best response is (T,R), and the result is the approxi-
mate implementation of the SCF f – exact in state t
′
– in rationalizable strategies.
12This contradicts an assertion made in Oury and Tercieux (2012, footnote 4), which also
attributes this result to an incomplete-information adaptation of the types of argument used in
Bergemann and Morris (2011) and Bergemann, Morris, and Tercieux (2011).
13The reader is referred to Example 2 of Kunimoto (2019) to see how to explicitly check that
NWR is satisfied.
33
Here, the set of rationalizable strategies is a singleton, so that it corresponds to
the unique strict Bayesian equilibrium. Defining the perturbed SCF f  as follows:
f (t) = (1− )a+ d and f (t′) = b, this implies that the SCF f  is exactly imple-
mentable in rationalizable strategies by the finite mechanism we constructed and
the set of rationalizable strategy profiles is a singleton. Therefore, given the result
by Dekel, Fudenberg, and Morris (2007), that the correspondence of (interim cor-
related) rationalizable strategies in a finite game is upper hemicontinuous in the
product topology in the universal type space, f  is also strictly continuously im-
plementable by the same finite mechanism.14 By Theorem 3 of Oury and Tercieux
(2012), we thus conclude that f  satisfies IRM, whereas the unperturbed SCF f
violates it. In fact, we can also show that f  satisfies IRM explicitly.
Moreover, the mechanism when  = 0 fully and exactly implements the SCF
f in Bayesian equilibrium, although the equilibrium ceases to be strict. However,
the mechanism when  = 0 fails to implement f in rationalizable strategies, be-
cause, while truth-telling continues to be strictly dominant for type t, it is only
weakly dominant for type t
′
, even though the nontruthful report for type t
′
is a
best response to one belief only, namely, that agent 2 chooses the cell (T,R) with
probability one. This suggests that the insistence on “strict” continuous implemen-
tation, rather than continuous implementation, is crucial for Theorem 3 of Oury
and Tercieux (2012). The very same point is also made by Chen, Kunimoto, and
Sun (2019), who characterize (not strict) continuous implementation by allowing
for small transfers.
To understand how our canonical mechanism succeeds in this example, the
unacceptable deception used by agent 1, in which type t
′
pretends to be type t, is
undermined by agent 2, who becomes the test-agent and induces Rule 2, imposing
alternative d with arbitrarily high probability. We conjecture that this should still
be feasible in a simpler mechanism, although it is not possible if one insists on
finiteness (Bergemann and Morris (2008, Proposition 2)).
9 Conclusion
This paper has uncovered rationalizable incentive compatibility (RIC) of SCSs as
the basis of a more permissive theory of incentives. Aside from RIC, closure and
uniform Bayesian monotonicity have also been shown to be necessary for ratio-
nalizable implementation. Furthermore, all three are also sufficient, if one adds
a few extra weak regularity conditions. Exploring other implications of RIC, for
instance, revisiting key definitions under incomplete information, such as efficiency
14Proposition 1 of Dekel, Fudenberg, and Morris (2007) shows that all types that have the
same hierarchies of beliefs have the same set of interim correlated rationalizable strategies.
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(Holmstro¨m and Myerson (1983)) or the core (Wilson (1978)) should be part of
our future research agenda.
A. Appendix
In this appendix, we provide all the omitted proofs of results in the paper. We also
discuss how to extend our results to more general environments.
A.1. Proof of Theorem 4
By closure, without loss of generality, we restrict attention to type spaces where
the event T is belief-closed. Also, for much of the proof, and in order to simplify
notation, we work with the type ti, as opposed to the extended type τi that we
get from RIC. We only use the extended type τi in Step 3, where RIC is actually
invoked.
We use the mechanism Γ = (M, g) constructed in the main text. Now, we
proceed to the formal proof.
Step 1: σi(ti) ∈ SΓ(T )i (ti)⇒ σ6i (ti) = 1.
Proof of Step 1: Fix ti ∈ Ti. Let σi(ti) = (m1i ,m2i ,m3i ,m4i ,m5i ,m6i ) ∈
S
Γ(T )
i (ti). Suppose, by way of contradiction, that m
6
i > 1. Then, for any profile of
messages m−i that agent i’s opponents may play, (mi,m−i) will trigger either Rule
2 or Rule 3. We can partition the message profiles of all agents but i as follows:
M2−i(t−i) ≡ {m−i ∈M−i| (mi,m−i) triggers Rule 2,}
and
M3−i(t−i) ≡
{
m−i ∈M−i
∣∣ (mi,m−i) triggers Rule 3.}
Suppose first that type ti has a belief λi ∈ ∆(T−i ×M−i) under which Rule 3
is triggered with positive probability, so that
∑
t−i
∑
m−i∈M3−i(t−i) λi(t−i,m−i) > 0.
If Ui(m
4
i |ti) > Ui(α¯|ti), we define mˆi as being almost the same as mi, except that
mˆ6i is chosen to be larger than m
6
i . In doing so, agent i decreases the probability
that α¯ is chosen in Rule 3. Conditional on Rule 3, this would be a better response,
which is a contradiction.
If one has the opposite inequality, note that, under Rule 3, by choosing an
appropriate lottery mˆ4i , each agent has a strict incentive to reduce the probability
that α¯ occurs. This is possible due to Lemma 1. Thus, we can define mˆi as being
almost the same as mi, except that mˆ
4
i is suitably chosen, and mˆ
6
i is chosen to be
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larger than m6i . Similarly, conditional on Rule 3, this would yield a better response,
a contradiction.
Therefore, for any rationalizable message profile, the probability that agent i
places on Rule 3 occurring is zero.
Now suppose that agent i believes that Rule 2 will be triggered with positive
probability, so that
∑
t−i
∑
m−i∈M2−i(t−i) λi(t−i,m−i) > 0. Thus, there exists exactly
one “odd man out.” Call him i. Conditional on Rule 2, by NWR, we can suitably
choose mˆ3i [1], mˆ
3
i [2], and mˆ
6
i large enough, to show that the original message mi
would not be a best response to such beliefs, by constructing a better message mˆi,
which is almost the same as mi, except mˆ
3
i [1], mˆ
3
i [2], and mˆ
6
i .
It follows that, in all cases, these choices of mˆi strictly improve the expected
payoff of type ti if either Rule 2 or Rule 3 is triggered. This implies that mi
is never a best response to any belief λi, which contradicts our hypothesis that
mi ∈ SΓ(T )i (ti). 
Step 2: mi ∈ SΓ(T )i (ti)⇒ λmi,tii (t−i,m−i) = 0 for any t−i and any profile (mi,m−i)
under Rules 2 or 3, where λmi,tii ∈ ∆(T−i×M−i) represents the belief held by type
ti to which mi is a best response.
Proof of Step 2: This follows from Step 1, since every rationalizable message
must consist of m6i = 1 for every i ∈ N and the support of the beliefs held by each
type must lie in the set of rationalizable profiles. 
Step 3: F ⊆ g ◦ SΓ(T ). That is, for any f ∈ F , there exists σf ∈ SΓ(T ) such that
g ◦ σf ≈ f .
Proof of Step 3: Let f ∈ F be arbitrarily chosen, and observe that, by
RIC, there exists an extended type profile τ f such that, for the expanded SCF f˜ ,
f˜ ◦ tˆ−1(τ f ) ≈ f(tˆ(τ f )). Recall also that, in the direct mechanism associated with
f˜ , truth-telling is rationalizable for every extended type.
Consider now a message mi = (m
1
i ,m
2
i ,m
3
i ,m
4
i ,m
5
i ,m
6
i ) of the following type
chosen by each type ti of each agent i in the mechanism Γ:
• for m1i , every τi such that tˆi(τi) = ti;
• for m2i , every f ∈ F ;
• any m3i ;
• any m4i ;
• any m5i ;
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• and m6i = 1.
We claim that any such message mi is rationalizable for type ti. By RIC, if every
agent uses any message in this set, the outcomes that result are exactly all the SCFs
in F . Also by RIC, and by NWR, every type is at a best response by only using his
truthful extended types, knowing that triggering Rule 2 would not result in a better
response. By compactness of F , there exists an SCF f ∗ti ∈ arg maxf∈F Ui(f |ti),
which maximizes type ti’s interim expected utility over F . Let λ
∗
i (ti) denote the
belief held by type ti that the SCF f
∗
ti
, announced by the elected king, say i + 1
(mod n + 1), will be the outcome. With such a belief, announcing any SCF in
F is a best response for type ti, since type ti does not think such SCFs will be
chosen in the actual outcome. And the same goes for any other choice of m5i , but
such announcements will be used to make sure that anyone can be the elected
king, thus justifying these beliefs held by every type ti of every agent i. Finally,
while the third and fourth elements of the message are irrelevant under Rule 1, by
construction of the mechanism and NWR, type ti would not have a better reply
by inducing Rule 2, hence justifying that m6i = 1.
In particular, for the arbitrarily chosen f ∈ F , σf can consist of m1 = τ f ,
m2 = f , and any m5. 
From now on, we assume that each agent i announces his original type ti, not
the extended type τi, in the first component of the message. This is without loss of
generality because we only need to extract his extended type τi to the extent that
it contains his original type ti and we obtain this simply by taking tˆi(τi) = ti where
τi constitutes the first component of the message. We introduce an additional piece
of notation. For any i ∈ N and any ti ∈ Ti:
S
Γ(T )
i [ti](ti) =
{
mi ∈ SΓ(T )i (ti)
∣∣∣ m1i = ti and m6i = 1}
S
Γ(T )
i [βi](ti) =
{
mi ∈ SΓ(T )i (ti)
∣∣∣ m1i = βi(ti) and m6i = 1}
for any deception β.
Now, for each t ∈ T , we define
SΓ(T )[β](t) =
∏
i∈N
S
Γ(T )
i [βi](ti).
We say that σ ∈ SΓ(T )[β] if, for each t ∈ T , σ(t) ∈ SΓ(T )[β](t). We also define
S
Γ(T )
i (ti) = S
Γ(T )
i [ti](ti) ∪
(⋃
β∈B
S
Γ(T )
i [βi](ti)
)
.
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And, of course,
SΓ(T )(t) =
∏
i∈N
S
Γ(T )
i (ti).
We denote the identity map by Ii : Ti → Ti such that Ii(ti) = ti for every ti ∈ Ti.
Step 4: ∀i ∈ N : βi 6= Ii ⇒ SΓ(T )i [βi] = ∅.
Proof of Step 4: By contradiction, suppose that we have σ¯j = (βj, m¯j, m¯
3
j , m¯
4
j , m¯
5
j , 1) ∈
S
Γ(T )
j [βj] for some j ∈ N such that βj(tj) 6= tj for some tj ∈ Tj. By Step 2, agent j
of every type believes with probability one that Rule 1 is triggered, implying that
there exists a deception β ∈ B such that the set SΓ(T )k [βk] is nonempty for every
k 6= j. Moreover, for any k 6= j, σ¯k ∈ SΓ(T )k [βk] implies that it is a best response
to λk ∈ ∆(T−k ×M−k), where the support of this belief consists of strategies that
trigger Rule 1 with probability one.
Take the profile σ¯ = (σ¯1, . . . , σ¯n) such that σ¯k ∈ SΓ(T )k [βk] for each k ∈ N .
Clearly, by construction, g ◦ σ¯ ≈ f¯ ∈ F ◦ β. By RD, we observe that F ◦ β 6⊆ F .
Therefore, by UBM, there must exist a violation of statement (∗∗), i.e., there
must exist i ∈ N , ti ∈ Ti, f ∗ ∈ F , and an SCF y∗ : T−i → ∆(A) such that:
(∗ ∗ ∗) Ui(f ∗|t˜i) ≥ Ui(y∗|t˜i) ∀t˜i ∈ Ti and Ui(f ∗ ◦ β|ti) < Ui(y∗ ◦ β|ti).
We begin with the following auxiliary claim, whose proof is provided in Sec-
tion A.1.1 below:
Claim 1 If σ¯ ∈ SΓ(T )[β], for any f ′ ∈ F ◦ β, there exists σf ′ ∈ SΓ(T )[β] such that
g ◦ σf ′ ≈ f ′.
We thus proceed with the proof. By Claim 1, there exists σ∗ ∈ SΓ(T )[β] such
that g◦σ∗ ≈ f ∗ ◦β and σ∗k(tk) = (βk(tk), σ∗2k (tk), σ∗3k (tk), σ∗4k (tk), σ∗5k (tk), 1) for each
k ∈ N and tk ∈ Tk. Since σ∗i (ti) ∈ SΓ(T )i [β](ti), there exists λi ∈ ∆(T−i ×M−i)
such that (i) λi(t−i,m−i) > 0⇒ m−i ∈ SΓ(T )−i (t−i) and (ii) for all m˜i ∈Mi,∑
t−i,m−i
λi(t−i,m−i)ui(g(σ∗i (ti),m−i); ti, t−i) ≥
∑
t−i,m−i
λi(t−i,m−i)ui(g(m˜i,m−i); ti, t−i).
Define
σˆ−i(σ∗i ) ∈ arg max
(σ∗i ,σ−i)∈SΓ(T )[β]
Ui(g ◦ (σ∗i , σ−i)|ti).
The existence of such a degenerate belief σˆ−i(σ∗i ) is guaranteed by our definition
of implementation. (Later, we check this property is indeed satisfied for the mech-
anism Γ constructed in this proof.) Without loss of generality, we assume that the
38
winner of the modulo game that yields the SCF g ◦ (σ∗i , σˆ−i(σ∗i )) is actually not
agent i himself. This can be seen in the proof of Claim 1.
The rest of the proof is intended to establish that σ∗i (ti) /∈ SΓ(T )i [β](ti). By
Claim 1, this will imply that σ¯i(ti) /∈ SΓ(T )i [β](ti), which will contradict our initial
hypothesis. This will complete the proof of Step 4.
We proceed to detail. Assume that g ◦ (σ∗i , σˆ−i(σ∗i )) 6≈ f ∗ ◦ β.15 First, we
observe that this assumption implies that |F ◦ β| ≥ 2. Since the SCS F satisfies
MCI and |F ◦ β| ≥ 2, the profile (σ∗i , σˆ−i(σ∗i )) is not a Bayesian Nash equilibrium
of the game Γ(T ), since there must exist at least one agent j ∈ N\{i} who has a
different strategy that is a better response to the profile (σ∗i , σˆ−i(σ
∗
i )). Since every
agent believes with probability one that Rule 1 is triggered, as we have established
in Steps 1 to 3, this further implies that there are no strategy profiles in SΓ(T )[β]
that are Bayesian Nash equilibria in the game Γ(T ). (In particular, σ∗ is not a
Bayesian Nash equilibrium in the game Γ(T ) either.)
The preceding argument confirms that S
Γ(T )
−i [β] contains multiple strategy pro-
files, which together with σ∗i , lead to distinct SCFs. This is consistent with our
assumption that g ◦ (σ∗i , σˆ−i(σ∗i )) and f ∗ ◦ β are two different SCFs, each of which
being induced by some rationalizable strategy profile (σ∗i , σ−i) with σ−i ∈ SΓ(T )−i [β].
We define λ˜i ∈ ∆(T−i ×M−i) as follows: λ˜i(t−i,m−i) = 0 if and only if m−i 6=
σˆ−i(σ∗i )[t−i]. We now define λ
ε
i ∈ ∆(T−i ×M−i) as the belief that assigns proba-
bility 1− ε to λ˜i and assigns probability ε to the event that all agents other than
i use σ∗−i.
By construction, σ∗i (ti) is a best response to λ˜i. We assume, without loss of
generality, that y∗ : T−i → ∆(A) is the best SCF for type ti such that Ui(f ∗|t˜i) ≥
Ui(y
∗|t˜i) for all t˜i and Ui(f ∗ ◦ β|ti) < Ui(y∗ ◦ β|ti).16 Fix ε > 0 small enough.
Since Ui(g ◦ (σ∗i (ti), σˆ−i(σ∗i )) ≥ Ui(g ◦ (m′i, σˆ−i(σ∗i )|ti) for any m′i ∈ Mi, the best
possible deviation σi(ti) = (m
1
i ,m
2
i ,m
3
i ,m
4
i ,m
5
i ,m
6
i ) by agent i of type ti is to
choose m3i [1] = y
∗, m3i [2] = f
∗, and m6i →∞, keeping the rest of her announcement
the same as σ∗i (ti) so that the SCF is changed only when f
∗ used to occur under
15Later we consider the case where g ◦ (σ∗i , σˆ−i(σ∗i )) ≈ f∗ ◦ β and argue that it can also be
handled by the same argument we are about to construct.
16This is indeed without loss of generality: one could take y∗ to be the supremum SCF over the
set of SCFs satisfying these inequalities, and then construct the argument below using a sequence
of SCFs converging to y∗.
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Rule 1. Therefore, for any m
′
i ∈Mi,∑
t−i,m−i
λεi (t−i,m−i)ui(g(m
′
i,m−i); ti, t−i)
≤ (1− ε)Ui(g ◦ (σ∗i , σˆ−i(σ∗i ))|ti) + εUi(y∗|ti)
= (1− ε)Ui(g ◦ (σ∗i , σˆ−i(σ∗i ))|ti) + εUi(f ∗|ti) + ε [Ui(y∗|ti)− Ui(f ∗|ti)]
=
∑
t−i,m−i
λεi (t−i,m−i)ui(g(σ
∗
i (ti),m−i); ti, t−i) + ε [Ui(y
∗|ti)− Ui(f ∗|ti)] .
Thus, we obtain that for any m
′
i ∈Mi,∑
t−i,m−i
λεi (t−i,m−i)ui(g(σ
∗
i (ti),m−i); ti, t−i)
≥
∑
t−i,m−i
λεi (t−i,m−i)ui(g(m
′
i,m−i); ti, t−i)− ε [Ui(y∗|ti)− Ui(f ∗|ti)] .
Set ε
′
= ε [Ui(y
∗|ti)− Ui(f ∗|ti)]. Hence, if we choose ε > 0 small enough (and
hence, ε
′
also small enough), we have argued that σ∗i (ti) is an ε
′
-best response for
type ti to λ
ε
i , even including deviations to messages that trigger Rule 2.
However, we next show the opposite. That is, we now show that σ∗i (ti) cannot be
an ε
′
-best response for type ti against λ
ε
i . Consider the already described deviation,
σi(ti) = (m
1
i ,m
2
i ,m
3
i ,m
4
i ,m
5
i ,m
6
i ), by agent i who chooses m
6
i arbitrarily large,
m3i [1] = y
∗, and m3i [2] = f
∗ but keeps the rest of her announcement the same
as σ∗i (ti) so that the SCF is changed only when f
∗ used to occur under Rule 1.
The construction of λεi guarantees that, given σ
∗
i (ti), the SCF f
∗ is realized with
probability ε. We define {ε(m6i )} as a sequence on R such that (i) ε(m6i ) > 0 for
each m6i ; (ii) ε(m
6
i )→ 0 as m6i →∞; and (iii)
1
m6i+1
ε(m6i )
→ 0 as m6i →∞
For example, we can set ε(m6i ) = 1/
√
m6i + 1, which satisfies the three properties.
Recall that (σ∗i (ti), σˆ−i(σ
∗
i )) induces type ti’s best SCF under any rationalizable
strategy profile because type ti announces 1 in the sixth component of the message
(by Step 1) and believes with probability one that other agents also announce
1 in the sixth component of the message (by Step 2). This implies that Ui(g ◦
(σ∗i (ti), σ˜−i(σ
∗
i ))|ti) ≥ Ui(y∗|ti) because if we have Ui(g ◦ (σ∗i (ti), σ˜−i(σ∗i ))|ti) <
Ui(y
∗|ti), type ti finds it better to induce Rule 2 by announcing a number higher
than 1 in the sixth component of the message given the belief that other agents
play σ˜−i(σ∗i ). This contradicts our Step 1 in which every type announces 1 in the
sixth component under rationalizability.
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We next show that there exists ε > 0 small enough, such that σ∗i (ti) is not an
ε
′
-best response to λεi , where ε
′
= ε [Ui(y
∗|ti)− Ui(f ∗|ti)]. Indeed, we confirm this
as follows:
∑
t−i,m−i
λ
ε(m6i )
i (t−i,m−i)ui(g(σi(ti),m−i); ti, t−i)− ε
′
(m6i )
= (1− ε(m6i ))
[
m6i
m6i + 1
Ui(g ◦ (σ∗i (ti), σˆ−i(σ∗i ))|ti)) +
1
m6i + 1
Ui(y¯i[g ◦ (σ∗i , σˆ−i(σ∗i )]|ti)
]
+ε(m6i )
[
m6i
m6i + 1
Ui(y
∗; ti) +
1
m6i + 1
Ui(y¯i[g ◦ (σ∗i , σˆ−i(σ∗i )]|ti)
]
− ε′(m6i )
(∵ agent i is not the winner of the modulo game under (σi, σˆ−i(σ∗i )).)
≥ m
6
i
m6i + 1
[
(1− ε(m6i ))Ui(g ◦ (σ∗i (ti), σˆ−i(σ∗i ))|ti) + ε(m6i )Ui(y∗|ti)
]
+
1
m6i + 1
Ui(y¯i[g ◦ (σ∗i , σˆ−i(σ∗i )]|ti))− ε(m6i ) [Ui(g ◦ (σ∗i (ti), σˆ−i(σ∗i ))|ti)− Ui(f ∗|ti)]
(∵ ε′(m6i ) = ε(m6i ) [Ui(y∗|ti)− Ui(f ∗|ti)] and Ui(g ◦ (σ∗i (ti), σˆ−i(σ∗i ))|ti) ≥ Ui(y∗|ti))
≈ (1− ε(m6i ))Ui(g ◦ (σ∗i (ti), σˆ−i(σ∗i ))|ti) + ε(m6i )Ui(y∗|ti)
−ε(m6i ) [Ui(g ◦ (σ∗i (ti), σˆ−i(σ∗i ))|ti)− Ui(f ∗|ti)]
(if we choose m6i large enough so that 1/(m
6
i + 1)→ 0 but ε(m6i ) > 0.)
= (1− 2ε(m6i ))Ui(g ◦ (σ∗i (ti), σˆ−i(σ∗i ))|ti) + ε(m6i ) [Ui(y∗|ti) + Ui(f ∗|ti)]
= (1− 2ε(m6i ))Ui(g ◦ (σ∗i (ti), σˆ−i(σ∗i ))|ti) + 2ε(m6i )Ui(y∗|ti)− ε(m6i ) [Ui(y∗|ti)− Ui(f ∗|ti)]
≈ (1− 2ε(m6i ))Ui(g ◦ (σ∗i (ti), σˆ−i(σ∗i ))|ti) + 2ε(m6i )Ui(y∗|ti)
(if we choose ε(m6i ) small enough, noting 2Ui(y
∗|ti) > Ui(y∗|ti)− Ui(f ∗|ti))
≈ (1− ε(m6i ))Ui(g ◦ (σ∗i (ti), σˆ−i(σ∗i ))|ti) + ε(m6i )Ui(y∗|ti)
(if we choose m6i large enough so that ε(m
6
i )→ 0)
> (1− ε(m6i ))Ui(g ◦ (σ∗i (ti), σˆ−i(σ∗i ))|ti) + ε(m6i )Ui(f ∗|ti)
(∵ Ui(y∗|ti) > Ui(f ∗|ti), and ε(m6i ) > 0.)
=
∑
t−i,m−i
λ
ε(m6i )
i (t−i,m−i)ui(g(σ
∗
i (ti),m−i); ti, t−i).
Hence, we have established the desired opposite inequality, showing that σ∗i (ti)
is not an ε
′
-best response for type ti against λ
ε
i .
17
17To make our argument more transparent, we could divide it into the following two cases. We
first assume Ui(g ◦ (σ∗i (ti), σˆ−i(σ∗i ))|ti) > Ui(y∗|ti). In this case, we immediately obtain a strict
inequality even before we take 1/(m6i + 1) → 0. Otherwise, i.e., if Ui(g ◦ (σ∗i (ti), σˆ−i(σ∗i ))|ti) =
Ui(y
∗|ti), when we obtain (1 − 2ε(m6i ))Ui(g ◦ (σ∗i (ti), σˆ−i(σ∗i ))|ti) + 2ε(m6i )Ui(y∗|ti), this is
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For the case where g ◦ (σ∗i , σˆ−i(σ∗i )) ≈ f ∗, we first observe that σ∗i (ti) is a best
response to λεi independently of the size of ε because g◦(σ∗i , σˆ−i(σ∗i )) ≈ g◦σ∗ ≈ f ∗.
We next claim that if we choose m6i large enough, the same deviation strategy
σi(ti) constructed above is a better response to λ
ε
i than σ
∗
i (ti). Specifically, given
the belief λεi , σi(ti) induces the SCF y
∗ with probability m6i /(m
6
i + 1) and the SCF
y¯i[f
∗] with the rest of probability. Since Ui(y∗|ti) > Ui(f ∗|ti), by choosing m6i large
enough, we obtain∑
t−i,m−i
λεi (t−i,m−i)ui(g(σi(ti),m−i); ti, t−i) >
∑
t−i,m−i
λεi (t−i,m−i)ui(g(σ
∗
i (ti),m−i), ti, t−i).
Thus, even if g ◦ (σ∗i , σˆ−i(σ∗i )) ≈ f ∗, we obtain the desired contradiction, as in the
previous case. Hence, regardless of whether g ◦ (σ∗i , σˆ−i) 6≈ f ∗ or g ◦ (σ∗i , σˆ−i) ≈ f ∗,
we conclude that σ∗i /∈ SΓ(T )i [β]. This completes the proof of Step 4. 
Now, we shall complete the proof of Theorem 4. By Step 4, it follows that for
any t ∈ T ∗,
SΓ(T )(t) =
∏
i∈N
S
Γ(T )
i (ti) =
∏
i∈N
(
S
Γ(T )
i [ti](ti) ∪
(⋃
β∈B
S
Γ(T )
i [βi](ti)
))
=
∏
i∈N
S
Γ(T )
i [ti](ti).
This, together with Step 3, further implies that for any t ∈ T ∗,⋃
m∈SΓ(T )(t)
{g(m)} = F (t).
Finally, we need to show that in this canonical mechanism, for any i ∈ N, ti ∈ Ti,
and σi ∈ SΓ(T )i , there exist a belief λσi(ti)i ∈ ∆(T−i × M−i) and profile of pure
strategies σ−i ∈ SΓ(T )−i such that λσi(ti)i (t−i, σ−i(t−i)) = 1 for each t−i ∈ T−i and
σi(ti) is a best response against λ
σi(ti)
i . Throughout Steps 1 through 4, every type
believes with probability one that Rule 1 is triggered (i.e., m6i = 1 for each i ∈ N)
and all agents truthfully announce their type in the first component of the message.
This implies that m3i and m
4
i do not matter under rationalizability. Therefore, each
type ti’s belief concentrated over T−i×M3i ×M4i can be made degenerate without
loss of generality. For each type ti, we define f
∗
i ∈ arg maxf˜∈F Ui(f˜ |ti). Then, type
ti’s belief, λi can be made degenerate over T−i ×M2−i ×M5−i such that some other
player j becomes the winner of the modulo game and the winner of the modulo
game chooses m2j = f
∗
i with probability one. Hence, the desired property (2) of
implementability is satisfied for the mechanism we have constructed.
This concludes the proof of Theorem 4. 
equivalent to (1 − ε(m6i ))Ui(g ◦ (σ∗i (ti), σˆ−i(σ∗i ))|ti) + ε(m6i )Ui(y∗|ti). This is larger than
(1− ε(m6i ))Ui(g ◦ (σ∗i (ti), σˆ−i(σ∗i ))|ti) + ε(m6i )Ui(f∗|ti), regardless of the size of ε(m6i ).
42
A.1.1. Proof of Claim 1
We set n + 1 ≡ 1 and 0 ≡ n. Fix f ′ ∈ F ◦ β. We minimally modify σ¯ to
construct a strategy profile σf
′
, which induces Rule 1 with probability one, and in
which all agents announce their type via β in the first component of their message,
and agent i + 1 becomes the winner of the modulo game, as follows. First, for
agent i+ 1, define σf
′
i+1(ti+1) = (βi+1(ti+1), σ
f
′
,2
i+1 (ti+1), σ¯
3
i+1(ti+1), σ¯
4
i+1(ti+1), i+ 1, 1)
for each type ti+1 ∈ Ti, where σf
′
,2
i+1 (ti+1) = f
′
for each ti+1. Second, for each
j ∈ N\{i+ 1}, define σf
′
j (tj) = (βj(tj), σ
f
′
,2
j (tj), σ¯
3
j (tj), σ¯
4
j (tj), 1, 1) for each tj such
that we remain ambiguous about the choice of σf
′
,2
j (tj) ∈ F ◦ β. Even if we are
largely ambiguous about the specification of the second component of the message
for each agent j 6= i+1, our construction of σf ′ guarantees that g◦σf ′ ≈ f ′ . Agent
i + 1 of each type ti+1 believes with probability one that someone else will be the
winner of the modulo game and the winner of the modulo game will choose the
best one among all SCFs in F ◦ β for type ti+1. Moreover, each agent j 6= i+ 1 of
each type tj believes with probability one that someone else will be the winner of
the modulo game, and that the winner of the modulo game will choose the best one
among all SCFs in F ◦ β for type tj. What remains to show is that σf
′ ∈ SΓ(T )[β].
We proceed to do so.
First, we show that σf
′
i+1(ti+1) is a best response for type ti+1 to some belief.
Define λ∗i+1 ∈ ∆(T−(i+1)×M−(i+1)) with support of the following property: type ti+1
believes with probability one that someone else will be the winner of the modulo
game, and that the winner of the modulo game will choose the best one fi+1 among
all SCFs for type ti+1, i.e.,
fi+1 ∈ arg max
β˜−(i+1):(βi+1,β˜−(i+1))∈B,f˜∈F◦(βi+1,β˜−(i+1))
Ui+1(f˜ |ti+1).
Assume j ∈ N\{i + 1}. We show that σf
′
j (tj) is a best response for type tj to
some belief. Define λ∗j ∈ ∆(T−j ×M−j) with support of the following property:
each agent j 6= i+1 of each type tj believes with probability one that someone else
will be the winner of the modulo game, and that the winner of the modulo game
will choose the best one fj among all SCFs for type tj, i.e.,
fj ∈ arg max
β˜−j :(βj ,β˜−j)∈B,f˜∈F◦(βj ,β˜−j)
Uj(f˜ |tj).
In sum, we conclude that we have σf
′ ∈ SΓ(T )[β] such that g ◦ σf ′ ≈ f ′ , as
desired. 
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A.2. Proof of Theorem 5
Necessity of RIC and closure follows from Theorems 1 and 2, respectively. We are
left with sufficiency. Sufficiency follows from a variant of the canonical mechanism
constructed in the proof of Theorem 4, as we explain next.
First, we show the following proposition, establishing that, in these economic
environments, an important preference-nestedness condition involving deceptions
across types is impossible.
Proposition 4 Suppose that an SCS F contains a continuous SCF f ∈ F such
that for every agent i = 1, 2, (i) Ui(f |0) = 0, and (ii) for ti ∈ (0, 1], Ui(f |ti) > 0.
Then, for any deception β ∈ B, the following preference-nestedness condition can
never hold:
(PN)
[
Ui(f |t˜i) ≥ Ui(y|t˜i) ∀t˜i ∈ Ti
⇒ Ui(f ◦ β|ti) ≥ Ui(y ◦ β|ti)
]
, ∀i ∈ N, ∀ti ∈ Ti.
Proof of Proposition 4: Throughout the proof of the proposition, we focus
on a continuous SCF f ∈ F satisfying assumptions (i) and (ii) above. First, we
have a profile of bidding strategies underlying f , denoted by σ = (σ1, σ2). Fixing
i ∈ {1, 2} arbitrarily, σi : [0, 1] → R is agent i’s continuous bidding function, and
denoting by g the outcome function corresponding to the first-price auction, we
can write that g ◦ σ ≈ f . Next, we identify the SCFs y : T−i → ∆(A) for which
the first clause of (PN) holds, i.e.,
Ui(f |t˜i) ≥ Ui(y|t˜i) ∀t˜i ∈ Ti.
Since this inequality is imposed on all types, it is also imposed on t˜i = 0. Since,
by assumption (i) in the proposition, Ui(f |0) = 0, the expected utility of y must
also be at most zero. Since y does not depend on agent i’s type, it must be that y
consists of outcomes where the good is always allocated to agent j 6= i, or if it is
allocated to agent i, it must be sold to i for a price of 1 (in this way, no type can
ever get positive expected utility under the SCF y).
The rest of the proof of the proposition is completed by two claims.
Claim 2 For any deception β ∈ B, if βi(0) 6= 0 for some i = 1, 2, Condition (PN)
cannot hold.
Proof of Claim 2: Choose a deception β such that βi(0) 6= 0 for some i = 1, 2.
We set βi(0) = t¯i ∈ (0, 1]. Consider now the second clause in (PN) for type ti = 0.
For (PN) to hold, we must have:
Ui(f ◦ β|0) ≥ Ui(y ◦ β|0).
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However, although Ui(y ◦ β|0) = 0, we now show that Ui(f ◦ β|0) < 0.
By assumption (ii) in the statement of the proposition, type t¯i’s expected utility
from f is:
Ui(f |t¯i) = (t¯i − σi(t¯i))
∫
[0,1]
Prob{σi(t¯i) ≥ σj(tj)}dtj > 0.
This implies that the probability that this type gets the good is positive, i.e.,∫
[0,1]
Prob{σi(t¯i) ≥ σj(tj)}dtj > 0, further implying that σi(t¯i) > 0.
With the deception β, type ti = 0’s expected utility from f ◦ β is precisely:
Ui(f ◦ β|0) = −σi(t¯i)
∫
[0,1]
Prob{σi(t¯i) ≥ σj(tj)}dtj < 0.
We thus obtain the desired inequality. 
Claim 3 For any deception β ∈ B, if βi(0) = 0 for both i = 1, 2, there exists
j ∈ {1, 2} and type tj ∈ [0, 1] such that Uj(f ◦ β|tj) < 0. Thus, condition (PN)
cannot hold for β.
Proof of Claim 3: Suppose, by way of contradiction, that there exists a
deception β ∈ B such that βi(0) = 0 and Ui(f ◦ β|ti) ≥ 0 for every i = 1, 2 and
ti ∈ [0, 1]. Since β is a deception, there must exist i ∈ N and type ti ∈ (0, 1] such
that βi(ti) 6= ti. We focus on such agent i in the rest of the argument. We define
ti[β] = inf{t˜i ∈ [0, 1] : βi(t˜i) 6= t˜i}
We then establish the following key auxiliary lemma:
Lemma 2 Suppose that there exists a deception β ∈ B such that βi(0) = 0 and
Ui(f ◦ β|ti) ≥ 0 for every i = 1, 2 and ti ∈ [0, 1]. Then, there exists a deception
β
′ ∈ B, β ′j = βj for j 6= i, such that ti[β ′ ] = ti[β]/2, defined as follows: there exists
ε > 0 small enough so that β
′
i(ti[β]/2) = ti[β]/2 − ε > 0; β ′i(ti) = βi(ti) for any
other type ti; and Ui(f ◦ β ′ |ti) ≥ 0 for every ti ∈ [0, 1].
Proof of Lemma 2: By construction of β
′
, we have Ui(f ◦β ′ |ti) ≥ 0 for every
ti 6= ti[β]/2. By definition of ti[β], we have βi(ti[β]/2) = ti[β]/2. By assumption
(ii) in the statement of the proposition, we have that Ui(f ◦ β|ti[β]/2) > 0. By the
continuity of f and of expected utility, we can choose ε > 0 small enough so that
Ui(f ◦ β ′|ti[β]/2) > 0. Since β ′ is the same as β except for type ti[β ′ ] = ti[β]/2, in
particular agent j 6= i still wins with the same probability, paying the same price.
We thus have that Ui(f ◦ β ′|ti) ≥ 0 for all ti ∈ [0, 1], as desired. 
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With the repeated application of this lemma, one builds a loop that eventually
leads to a contradiction. Specifically, one can construct a pair of sequences, {βk}∞k=0
and {ti[βk]}∞k=0, such that β0 = β, satisfying βki (0) = 0 and Ui(f ◦ βk|ti) ≥ 0 for
every i = 1, 2 and ti ∈ [0, 1], and ti[βk+1] = (1/2)kti[β] for each nonnegative integer
k ≥ 0. By construction, if one chooses K large enough, we have that ti[βK ] is
arbitrarily close to zero.
Consider now the second clause in (PN) for type ti = ti[β
K ]−ε > 0. For (PN)
to hold, we must have:
Ui(f ◦ βK+1|ti[βK ]− ε) ≥ Ui(y ◦ βK+1|ti[βK ]− ε).
We know that Ui(y◦βK+1|ti[βK ]−ε) = 0, but we now show that Ui(f◦βK+1|ti[βK ]−
ε) < 0.
Once again, by assumption (ii) in the statement of the proposition, type ti[β
K ]−
ε receives positive expected utility from f :
Ui(f |ti[βK ]−ε) = (ti[βK ]−ε−σi(ti[βK ]−ε))
∫
[0,1]
Prob{σi(ti[βK ]−ε) ≥ σj(tj)}dtj > 0.
This implies that
∫
[0,1]
Prob{σi(ti[βK ]− ε) ≥ σj(tj)}dtj > 0, which in turn implies
that σi(ti[β
K ]− ε) > 0. On the other hand, recalling that type ti[βK ] is arbitrarily
close to 0, this type’s expected utility from f ◦ βK+1 is:
Ui(f ◦ βK+1|ti[βK ]) = −σi(ti[βK ]− ε)
∫
[0,1]
Prob{σi(ti[βK ]− ε) ≥ σj(tj)}dtj < 0.
We thus obtain the desired inequality, a violation of condition (PN) for deception
βK+1. Since the lemma above can be read as follows: “if there exists a deception
βk with some properties, there exists a deception βk+1 with the same properties,”
we can unravel its conclusions, starting from βK+1 and going backwards in the
sequence, to conclude that β0 = β does not have the assumed properties. We
therefore have that, either βi(0) 6= 0, or there is a type ti ∈ [0, 1] such that
Ui(f ◦ β|ti) < 0. The former is impossible, as it would contradict Claim 2, so we
must have the latter, and hence, the proof of Claim 3 is complete. 
By Claims 2 and 3, we conclude that (PN) can never hold for any deception
β. This completes the proof of Proposition 4. 
To continue with the proof of Theorem 5, we modify slightly the proof of the
general sufficiency theorem in section 6, i.e., Theorem 4.18 We note that the MCI
18Or more precisely, its extension in the appendix (Section A.3), which takes care of environ-
ments where type spaces are compact subsets of Euclidean spaces, such as intervals in the real
line, as is the case here.
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condition is trivially satisfied in these environments, as, after the assumed f is
in the SCS, there is no SCF that simultaneously can be the maximizer of every
type and every agent’s expected utility within F , given the definition of the set
of alternatives in the first-price auction. Furthermore, the NWR condition, used
to impose bad outcomes after deviations, can be dispensed with, by always using
“Zero” as the bad outcome in Rule 2 of the implementing mechanism, i.e., the
good is allocated to the deviating agent with probability zero. Similarly, outcome
α¯ in Rule 3 can be replaced with a collection of outcomes that use the “Zero”
outcome as well as others where the good is assigned to each agent with small
uniform probability.
After these changes are made, note that Steps 1, 2, and 3 in the proof of
Theorem 4 go through with no change. The only modification in the proof of Step
4 uses Proposition 4, instead of the RD and UBM conditions, to show the existence
of the preference reversal (∗∗∗), for any deception β. No further change is needed,
and the proof of Theorem 5 is complete. 
A.3. Extension to a More General Setup
We extend this paper’s analysis to a more general environment with incomplete in-
formation. Assume that Ti is a Polish space Ti associated with its Borel σ-algebra
Ti. We endow T−i and T with the product Borel sigma-algebras T−i and T , re-
spectively. Note that T−i and T are also Polish spaces. Let ∆(T−i) denote the
set of probability distributions on the measurable space (T−i,T−i) endowed with
the weak* topology. Each agent i’s system of “interim” beliefs is expressed as a
Ti-measurable function pii : Ti → ∆(T−i). Then, we call (Ti,Ti, pii)i∈N a type space.
Let A denote the set of pure outcomes associated with its sigma-algebraA contain-
ing all singleton sets. Let ∆(A) be the set of probability distributions over measur-
able space (A,A ). Agent i’s state dependent von Neumann-Morgenstern utility
function is denoted ui : ∆(A)×T → R, which is assumed to be aA ×T -measurable
function. We can now define an environment as E = (A,A , {ui, Ti,Ti, pii}i∈N).
A subset of T is called an event if it is T -measurable.19 An event E = E1 ×
· · · × En ⊆ T is said to be belief-closed if, for each i ∈ N and ti ∈ Ei, we have
pii[ti](E−i) = 1. We assume that the planner only cares about the belief-closed
subset of the type space (T ∗i ,T
∗
i )i∈N where T
∗
i ⊆ Ti and T ∗i is its relative sigma-
algebra for every i ∈ N .
A (stochastic) social choice function (SCF) is a T -measurable function f :
T → ∆(A). Let F be the collection of all T -measurable SCFs. A social choice
set (SCS) F is defined as a nonempty compact subset of F. Two SCSs F and H
19Since T is the product measure, any event constitutes a product set.
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are said to be equivalent (F ≈ H) if there exists a bijection ξ : F → H such that
sup {|f(A|t)− h(A|t)| : t ∈ T ∗, A ∈ A } = 0 for every f ∈ F and every h ∈ H
satisfying h = ξ(f). This means that the two SCSs “coincide” for every t ∈ T ∗.
A mechanism (or game form) Γ = ((Mi,Mi)i∈N , g) describes a nonempty mes-
sage space Mi for each agent i, equipped with a sigma-algebra Mi and an M -
measurable outcome function g : M → ∆(A), where M = ×i∈NMi is associated
with product sigma-algebra M .
The interim expected utility of agent i of type ti that pretends to be of type t
′
i
in the direct-revelation mechanism associated with an SCF f , provided all other
agents are truthful, is defined as:
Ui(f ; t
′
i|ti) ≡
∫
T−i
ui(f(t
′
i, t−i); (ti, t−i))pii[ti](dt−i).
Let Ui(f |ti) = Ui(f ; ti|ti).
A.3.1. Implementation in Rationalizable Strategies
Given a mechanism Γ = (M,M , g), let Γ(T ) denote an incomplete information
game associated with a type space (Ti,Ti, pii)i∈N . Let σ−i : T−i → ∆(M−i) denote
a T−i-measurable randomized strategy profile of all agents other than i and Σ−i the
set of randomized strategies, where ∆(M−i) denotes the set of probability measures
over (M−i,M−i) endowed with the weak* topology. We assume that g ◦ (mi, σ−i)
is a T ×M -measurable function and g ◦ (mi, σ−i) ∈ F for every mi ∈ Mi and
σ−i ∈ Σ−i. With abuse of notation, we let
Ui(g ◦ (mi, σ−i)|ti) ≡
∫
T−i×M−i
ui(g(mi,m−i); (ti, t−i))σ−i(dm−i|t−i)pii[ti](dt−i).
We fix a mechanism Γ = (M,M , g) and define a message correspondence profile
S = (S1, . . . , Sn), where each Si : Ti → 2Mi , which is Mi-measurable and we write
S for the collection of message correspondence profiles. The collection S is a lattice
with the natural ordering of set inclusion: S ≤ S ′ if Si(ti) ⊆ S ′i(ti) for all i ∈ N
and ti ∈ Ti. The largest element is S¯ = (S¯1, . . . , S¯n), where S¯i(ti) = Mi for each
i ∈ N and ti ∈ Ti. The smallest element is S = (S1, . . . , Sn), where Si(ti) = ∅ for
each i ∈ N and ti ∈ Ti.
We define an operator b to iteratively eliminate never best responses. The
operator b : S → S is now defined as: for every i ∈ N and ti ∈ Ti,
bi(S)[ti] ≡
mi
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
∃T−i ×M−i-measurable λi ∈ ∆(T−i ×M−i) such that
(1)(t−i,m−i) ∈ supp(λi)⇒ m−i ∈ S−i(t−i);
(2)
∫
M−i
λi(t−i, dm−i) = pii(ti)[t−i];
(3)mi ∈ arg maxm′i
∫
T−i×M−i ui(g(m
′
i,m−i); ti, t−i)λi(dt−i, dm−i)
 .
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Observe that b is increasing by definition: i.e., S ≤ S ′ ⇒ b(S) ≤ b(S ′). By
Tarski’s fixed point theorem, there is a largest point of b, which we label SΓ(T ).
Thus, (i) b(SΓ(T )) = SΓ(T ) and (ii) b(S) = S ⇒ S ≤ SΓ(T ). We can also construct
the fixed point SΓ(T ) by starting with S¯ – the largest element of the lattice – and
iteratively applying the operator b.
Because the mechanism Γ is infinite, transfinite induction may be necessary to
reach the fixed point. It is useful to define
S
Γ(T ),k
i (ti) ≡ bi
(
bk−1
(
S¯
))
[ti],
using transfinite induction if necessary. Thus S
Γ(T )
i (ti) are the sets of messages
surviving (transfinite) iterated deletion of never best responses of type ti of agent
i. We denote by σi a Ti-measurable selection from S
Γ(T )
i and call it a rationalizable
strategy of player i. We acknowledge the following structure of SΓ(T ):
SΓ(T ) =
∏
i∈N
S
Γ(T )
i .
Next, we provide the definitions of rationalizable implementation that we use
in the paper.
Definition 14 (Full Implementation in Rationalizable Strategies) An SCS
F is fully implementable in rationalizable strategies if there exists a mech-
anism Γ = (M,M , g) with the following three properties: (i) for each t ∈ T ∗,⋃
m∈SΓ(T )(t)
{g(m)} = F (t),
(ii) for any i ∈ N, ti ∈ Ti, and σi ∈ SΓ(T )i , there exist a T−i×M−i-measurable belief
λ
σi(ti)
i ∈ ∆(T−i×M−i) and T−i-measurable σ−i ∈ SΓ(T )−i such that λσi(ti)i (t−i, σ−i(t−i)) =
1 a.s. for each t−i ∈ T−i and σi(ti) is a best response against λσi(ti)i , and (iii) for
any σ
′
, σ
′′ ∈ SΓ(T ) and T ′ , T ′′ ⊆ T for which T ′ ∪ T ′′ = T and T ′ ∩ T ′′ = ∅, there
exists f ∈ F such that for any t ∈ T ∗,
f(t) =
{
g(σ
′
(t)) if t ∈ T ′
g(σ
′′
(t)) if t ∈ T ′′
Definition 15 (Weak Implementation in Rationalizable Strategies) An SCS
F is weakly implementable in rationalizable strategies if there exists a
mechanism Γ = (M,M , g) with the following three properties: (i) for each t ∈ T ∗,
∅ 6=
⋃
m∈SΓ(T )(t)
{g(m)} ⊆ F (t),
and conditions (ii) and (iii) as above.
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A.3.2. Necessity for Rationalizable Implementation
This subsection discusses three necessary conditions: (1) rationalizable incentive
compatibility (RIC); (2) closure; and (3) uniform Bayesian monotonicity (UBM).
The proofs of the corresponding results are exactly as provided in the main text.
When dealing with a more general setup, no modification for RIC is needed. The
only modification we need for defining closure in a more general case is the mea-
surability requirement for events. More specifically, a subset of T is said to be an
event if it is T -measurable. Finally, the only modification one needs for UBM is
the requirement that each deception βi : Ti → Ti is Ti-measurable.
A.3.3. Sufficiency for Rationalizable Implementation
In this section, we discuss how one can extend Theorem 4 to a more general setup.
For each SCF f ∈ F, define
Yi[f ] ≡
{
yi : T−i → ∆(A)
∣∣∣∣ yi is T−i-measurable andUi(f |t˜i) ≥ Ui(yi|t˜i) ∀t˜i ∈ T ∗i
}
.
The set Yi[f ] is associated with its Borel σ-algebra Yi[f ].
Since Ti is a Polish space, ∆(Ti) can also be made Polish. We denote by {t`i}∞`=1
its countable dense subset of ∆(Ti). Similarly, since T−i × T−i is a Polish space,
∆(T−i × T−i) can also be made Polish. So, we denote by {ψki }∞k=1 its countable
dense subset of ∆(T−i × T−i). Since F satisfies NWR, for each f ∈ F and i ∈ N ,
we define the uniform SCF y¯i[f ] as follows: there exist δ, η ∈ (0, 1) such that
y¯i[f ] ≡ (1− δ)(1− η)
2
∞∑
`=1
η`−1
∞∑
k=1
δk−1
{
y
′
i[f ; t
`
i , ψ
k
i ] + yi[f ; t
`
i , ψ
k
i ]
}
.
Recall that this uniform SCF y¯i[f ] is used in the canonical mechanism for Theo-
rem 4. Note also that {t`i}∞`=1 is a dense subset of ∆(Ti) and {ψki }∞k=1 is a dense
subset of ∆(T−i × T−i), respectively. As expected utility is continuous in both
∆(Ti) and ∆(T−i × T−i), NWR together with the uniform SCF y¯i[f ] plays exactly
the same role in the proof of Theorem 4 as if the type space is countable.
Similarly, for each i ∈ N , we define the uniform lottery α¯i ∈ ∆(A) as follows:
there exist δ, η ∈ (0, 1) such that
α¯i ≡ (1− δ)(1− η)
2
∞∑
`=1
η`−1
∞∑
k=1
δk−1
{
α
′
i[t
`
i , φ
k
i ] + αi[t
`
i , φ
k
i ]
}
.
Finally, we define
α¯ ≡ 1
n
∑
i∈N
α¯i.
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Recall that this uniform lottery α¯ is used in the canonical mechanism of Theorem
4. Note also that {t`i}∞`=1 is a dense subset of ∆(Ti) and {ψki }∞k=1 is a dense subset
of ∆(T−i × T−i), respectively. Once again, as expected utility is continuous in
both ∆(Ti) and ∆(T−i × T−i), NWR (more precisely, Lemma 1) together with the
uniform lottery α¯ plays exactly the same role in the proof of Theorem 4 as if the
type space is countable.
We thus state the extension of Theorem 4 to a more general setup:
Theorem 6 If an SCS F satisfies rationalizable incentive compatibility, uniform
Bayesian monotonicity, closure, NWR, MCI, and RD, then it is fully implementable
in rationalizable strategies.
Proof : We use the same mechanism proposed in the proof of Theorem 4. In
the proposed mechanism Γ = (M,M , g), each agent i sends a message mi =
(m1i ,m
2
i ,m
3
i ,m
4
i ,m
5
i ,m
6
i ) ∈
∏6
k=1M
k
i = Mi where m
1
i ∈ Ti, m2i ∈ F, m3i =
(m3i [1],m
3
i [2]) where T−i-measurable m
3
i [1] : T−i → ∆(A) and m3i [2] ∈ F , m4i ∈
∆(A), m5i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, and m6i ∈ N = {1, 2, . . .}. The only modification we
need is to impose the measurability requirement over the message space. We set
Ti = (Ti ×Mi,Ti ×Mi) where Mi = Ti ×F ×
∏
f∈F Yi[f ]×F ×A × 2N × 2N is
its associated sigma-algebra.
The rest of the proof is completed by appropriately adapting that of Theorem
4 to the current setup. 
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